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Abstract

This thesis examines the turn to conflict in Syria during 2011 to see if it is revolutionary
in nature and if so, why has it not succeeded? This thesis aims to analyze the anatomy of Syria’s
“revolution” in order to determine the causes behind the initial popular mobilization and
transition to conflict. Then, further analysis of the essential elements of successful
revolutionary movements will be undertaken to reveal what conditions remain unmet for Syria
to culminate in a full revolutionary transformation. Special attention will be paid to the
revolutionary Opposition itself, since, to date, it has proved unable to generate the power
necessary to destroy the old order and rebuild a new system. The significant role of external
intervention will also be addressed, since these forces have simultaneously helped cause the
conflict, prolong the conflict and prop up the regime. Finally, the negative consequences of
undertaking a revolutionary process, especially when left only partially complete, will be
highlighted throughout the study. Syria’s own “rise of the radicals,” has manifested itself in the
phenomenon of ISIL or ISIS, which has proven the strongest and most violent Opposition group
to emerge from Syria’s revolutionary environment.
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Introduction
Revolutions are romanticized throughout history, yet are among the most chaotic,
violent and misunderstood of all social phenomena. Revolutionaries offer a break from the
past, and often promise a better, even utopian future. However, the reality of revolutions is far
from romantic and they do not always bring the promise of progress. Revolutions indisputably
bring change, but not just any change; revolutions bring “rapid, fundamental change in the
social structures as well as in a state’s personnel, institutions, and foundation of its legitimacy,
accomplished from outside the legal channels and accompanied in part by a movement from
below (the non-governing classes).” This thorough and precise definition of revolutions is from
Mohsen Milani’s 1988 book on The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to
Islamic Republic. This language applies to developments in Syria between 2011 and 2014, and
will be the benchmark by which we judge whether Syria’s case better fits a revolution or
rebellion.
This study will contend that the events in Syria carried the potential for revolution, and
that such a revolutionary process is already partially underway. However, the opportunity for
the full destruction of the old regime and a transition to singular sovereignty by a group from
outside the ruling polity remains elusive. Therefore, the revolutionary process has stalled and
will likely fail. Although events in Syria are unlikely to culminate in a full revolutionary
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transition, the process itself has unleashed radical forces from the ungoverned and violence
ridden environment of the Syrian conflict. The rise of the radicals – a key characteristic of
revolutionary societies - has manifested itself so powerfully, that Charles Tilly’s concept of
“multiple sovereignty” now exists and a de-facto independence movement by radicals may
have already succeeded. The rise of the radical, Western designated terrorist army, Islamic
State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), also termed Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) in many news
outlets, has led to a recreation of what ISIL has branded a new Islamic Caliphate modeled on a
medieval Islamic State (Al-Hayat 2014, b). This new “Islamic State,” was but one organization in
a greater opposition movement, yet now controls vast territory in Eastern Syria and Western
Iraq, over which is wields power and control tantamount to a fledgling third world nation. ISIL
also proudly proclaims to have destroyed the foundations of the old Sykes-Picot border, which
redrew the map of the region following World War I, and claims sovereignty over an area
roughly spanning eastern Syria and Western Iraq (Al-Hayat 2014, a).
As Syria’s socio-political crisis cultivated conflict, revolutionary conditions created an
environment where the most radical opposition group thrived. This phenomenon in part
explained in theory by Theda Skocpol (1979), who defined “social revolutions” as emerging
through mutually constitutive change in social and political structures. Both changes must
occur, and are usually caused by revolts by a class-based movement from below (4-5). Skocpol
argues that revolutions aren’t necessarily total breakpoints in history, but rather are newly
adopted systems based on an adaptation of the previous reality (171). This point is important
because in cases where a power vacuum exists, and contentious politics is dominated by war
and violence, the prospects for a smooth and orderly transition becomes lower. In such ungoverned societies, tackling their problems with a state centric theoretical approach proves
2

elusive (Clunan 2010). Therefore, reevaluating the cause-of systemic violence and radicalism in
such societies is imperative for policy makers and military planners who might be called on to
address global threats.
Revolutionary transitions often cause periods of systemic instability, instability and
radicalism. Conversely, the existence of structured mechanisms of opposition to fill vacuums of
governance can help ease transitions of the socio-political systems. This was the case of
Britain’s transformation, which was made easier because the dominant class was already
organized via the assembly. Therefore, they were able to channel revolutionary change against
the monarchy without completely destroying the old system and starting anew (Skocpol 1979,
181). However, in studying revolutionary France, Russia and China, Skocpol (1979) found the
more war and violence wracked the transformation process, the higher the likelihood of
radicalism. Here, Skocpol rightfully argued that it is often the strongest, most extreme forces
within the opposition that come to power since they are formed within the crucible of war.
Fear and counterrevolution led to radical republicanism in France, while foreign war in 1789
undermined the liberal phase of the French Revolution. Such events led to terror, oppression
and the eventual rise of the Napoleonic dictatorship (185). Wars and pervasive violence also
acted as a radicalizing force in Russia and China by which extremists took control and used
existential threats to the revolution to justify the centralization of power, the assumption of
authoritarian powers and the purge of rivals (195). Syria’s broader opposition and their
international supporters should have considered this this threat long ago. Meanwhile, ISIL’s
radicalization and power has increased as their foreign domination of territory in Iraq expands.
Rosemary O’Kane (1995) differs slightly from Skocpol, in that she argues for the primary
importance of civil conflict, vice foreign wars, as being responsible for shaping the post-regime
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struggle for power. As such, she claims that these civil conflicts are responsible for the
radicalism that influences the centralization of the new state. She argues that this is because
the revolutionary process is one of establishing civilian control over the revolutionary forces of
internal coercion. In revolutionary societies, the previous regime no longer wields the Weberian
concept of a “monopoly of force.” Therefore this primary demonstration of state sovereignty
and power must be reestablished. Only after the civil competition concludes, can state building
actually begin in earnest. This competition, unsurprisingly, is fierce and often marked by
conflict. Civil conflict, more than anything, is likely to be the radicalizing force most threatening
to Syria after the fall of Asad. ISIL has mastered this concept by dominating their enemies, in
the counter-governed space of Eastern Syria and Western Iraq where the monopoly of force
has broken down, and ISIL has filled the vacuum of governance (al-Hayat 2014, a) (Pollack
2012).
Although ISIL has not succeeded in completely destroying the old regime of Asad, they
are one of modern history’s most stark examples of the radical forces that can emerge from
revolutionary societies. Their brand of radicalism is includes brutal tactics, oppressive
governance, fundamental Islamic political system and a well-documented record of human
rights abuses (UNHCR 2014). ISIL’s style of radicalism will be further detailed in later sections.
The current crisis being precipitated under of their nascent rule has gained global attention and
action. This is because their new “Islamic State” has arguably created conditions for multiple
sovereignties, if not dual sovereignty, across the un-governed spaces in Syria and Iraq. Their
campaign could culminate in successful revolution, unsuccessful rebellion or a partially
successful independence movement. Now that the world sees such a reality as increasingly
evident, their capacity for governance will be tested. As O’Kane and Skocpol predicted, in such
4

situations, violent revolutionary groups eventually have to govern. ISIL was quick to claim that
transition when they declared the establishment of the “Islamic State,” modeled on Islamic
Caliphates of the past. By creating a model of statehood, ISIL has attempted to develop the
civil-military structure that legitimizes itself among the population it now controls, and in many
ways, they have succeeded (al-Hayat 2014, b).
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Chapter One: A Brief History of the Syrian Conflict
This chapter will define the conflict in Syria as one born of revolutionary potential. The
revolutionary phenomenon itself was partially triggered by events of the 2011 Arab Spring,
which swept the region as a social force that rejected authoritarian and oppression. However,
the forces of the Arab Spring were less unified around what they chose to represent. More
freedom and the right to self-determination were perhaps the greatest political demands, while
elements of liberalism and a yearning for democratic governance were also strong throughout
the movement, given the desire for popular sovereignty. The individuals within the movement
also sought greater socio-economic opportunities and less corruption in government.
The forces of the Arab Spring initially stoked unrest in Syria during March of 2011.
Nationwide protests against the authoritarian system of government under President Bashar alAsad eventually elicited violent crackdowns. Similar to Arab Spring movements across the
region, such state sponsored violence only served to inflame the public’s outrage. After months
of growing popular mobilization against the government, the protest movement morphed into
armed rebellion. This rebellion has since engulfed the nation, which has become the most
violent in the entire world. The nature of this conflict and its revolutionary characteristics will
be outlined throughout this study.
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Defining the Conflict
Over 191,000 Syrian’s have lost their lives since the brutal civil conflict began in 2011,
thousands at the hands of chemical weapons (Price 2014) (NYT 2014). Millions of refugees are
also externally or internally displaced, and the toll of the conflict has set the country’s
infrastructure, economy and civil society back decades (Fearon 2013). Syria’s conflict is one of
great destruction, but is it more aptly defined as a revolution, rebellion, civil war, or something
different altogether? While revolution has already been defined, rebellions generally represent
a violent uprising and can also retrospectively be identified as a failed attempt at revolution.
For this study, rebellions assume the same characteristics of revolutions, but stop short of
successfully replacing the old political order with a new one of the opposition. In short,
rebellions for the purpose of this paper can be considered failed revolutions. As for the more
general definition of “civil war,” it has been described by James Fearon (2013) as a violent
conflict within a country fought by organized groups that aim to take power at the center or in
a region, or to change government policies.” A quantitative measure can also be applied to
account for casualties and deaths, both of which Syria has far exceeded (Christia 2013) (Fearon
2013).
Regardless of the ultimate outcome in Syria, the first stages of the Syrian conflict have
mirrored that of a revolution in progress. Therefore, this study will adapt theories of revolution
to understanding the conflict. If Asad wins, history will likely remember the conflict as a failed
rebellion turned civil war; if he should fall, it could be remembered as a classic example of a
modern day revolution. This next section will address how such events arose out of the “Arab
Spring” movement, the transition from peaceful protest to violent conflict, and why the
situation deteriorated to one of self-sustaining violence.
7

The Transition from Popular Mobilization to Armed Conflict
Before destabilizing unrest even touched Syria, the sweeping Arab Spring phenomenon
began in Tunisia on 18 December 2010. The figurative spark of revolution was ignited by the
literal self-immolation of a Tunisian who resorted to a horrifying display of political protest
against the corruption and repression of his government (Reuters 2010). By the next month,
the Tunisian regime of Ben Ali was toppled and the writing was on the wall for Hosni Mubarak
in Egypt, whose three decade long rule had been seen as a mainstay of durability and stability
in the region. Syria’s Arab Spring began much like the others, as a peaceful protest movement
demanding major reforms. The protest movements in North Africa and the greater Middle East
inspired an incipient protest movement in Syria. In March 2011, protestors in Damascus and the
southern city of Deraa demanded the release of political prisoners (YouTube 2011, a).
Government forces responded with deadly force, a move that triggered days of violent unrest
that steadily spread across the entire country (BBC 2014, b). As organic protests rose up against
the Asad regime, local coordination committees began to form pockets of organized dissent.
These nascent and localized groups represented the seeds of an impending larger revolutionary
mobilization. The groups at first emerged in the cities of Deraa, Homs, Banias, Saraqeb, Idleb,
Hasaka, Qamishli, Der Ezzor, the Syrian Coast, Hama, Raqqa, Swayda’, the Damascus suburbs
and even Damascus proper. And in one of the first displays of organized contentious politics,
these groups issued joint demands to the Asad regime (Syrian local coordination committees
2011). By April, protests were being coordinated countrywide while many demanded the
resignation of Bashar al-Asad, and the end of Baath party rule. However, protestors were met
with the bloodiest day yet when security forces fired on crowds of protestors, killing dozens
(Telegraph online video 2011) (BBC 2014, a).
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At first, Asad wavered between force and conciliatory gestures; moves that were rooted
in pragmatism but ultimately revealed weakness. Following the initial crackdown on protests,
he also chose to release political prisoners, reshuffle the cabinet, fire unpopular government
officials and even lifted the 48-year-old state of emergency (BBC 2014, a). These were some of
the first erratic attempts by Asad to improvise policies to crush the Opposition with one hand
and appease them with the other. At times, when Asad sought to punish the Opposition, he
ordered uncompromising force to oppress dissent and disperse the growing popular
mobilization. At other times Syria’s nascent revolutionaries witnessed conciliatory acts by the
regime. This strategy was largely meant to appease national groups Asad hoped he could
compromise with, but it was also meant to ease international pressure.
The romanticized vision of Arab Spring revolutions led to significant press coverage of
the events in Syria, which shone a spotlight on the regime’s response to the popular
mobilization. Asad’s heavy-handed response to the Opposition showed he wanted to crush
dissent but his conciliatory acts likely reflected a consideration of his international standing and
fear of international intervention (Fearon 2013, 15). Much like other Arab Spring protest
movements, Syria’s began peacefully but turned violent after government forces exacerbated
public outrage by using excessive and indiscriminate force to quell the protestors (Telegraph
2011, a&b). The difference between a just use of force to contain unrest and the use of violence
to suppress dissent, is that the latter was practiced by the authoritarian rulers who most fell
prey to the Arab Spring phenomenon and succumbed to a violent evolution of their nations’
previously peaceful protest movements (Dot-Pouillard 2012).
By May 2011, Army tanks and other forces entered cities seen as hotbeds of the new
protest movement (YouTube 2011). Asad sought to crush anti-regime protests but at the same
9

time offered amnesty for political prisoners. The latter move came even after tightened U.S.
and European Union sanctions (NYT 2011). As the size and scope of the conflict grew, the
regime increasingly adopted violence, but this only served to harden and radicalize the resolve
of the growing opposition (BBC 2014, a). Between July and October of 2011, opposition groups
began to coalesce, whereas the previous expressions of collective outrage and unrest had
developed from the disparate and disaffected masses loosely organized under the local
coordination committees. One of the most prominent groups to form was the Free Syrian Army,
an insurgent militia composed of former Army soldiers and deserters who announced their
organization and armed opposition to the regime in October 2011 (Landis 2011). By late 2011,
opposition activists met in Istanbul in an attempt to agree upon a cohesive organizational
structure and mobilize support for a unified front that could topple the regime. These new
opposition groups agreed at the Istanbul meetings to announce the formation of an
organization, the Syrian National Council (SNC) to confer political legitimacy on the Opposition’s
efforts to provide strategic direction. The newly formed SNC emerged as the symbolic umbrella
group representing the different opposition groups. However, most opposition groups remain
independent and without centralized leadership by 2014 (O’Bagy 2013, b, 6, 10, 28).
As the popular mobilization transitioned to violent conflict, the Opposition realized the
importance of gaining international backing to strengthen their movement and weaken Asad.
While the SNC and other friends of the Syrian Opposition successfully gained some Arab State
funding and international backing, the opposition’s mostly moral support has been significantly
offset by real, tangible Russian and Iranian support to the Asad regime itself (Dickinson 2013).
Russia and China also blocked U.N. motions to target the Asad regime and aid the Opposition
(UN 2011). The only international organization to seriously support the Opposition and
10

condemn Asad was the Arab League, which sent observers into the country in late 2011 (BBC
2014, b). Eventually the Arab League went as far as to suspend Syria’s membership, which
perpetuated the sentiment that the Syria conflict was becoming an increasingly sectarian one
with Arab Sunni monarchies on one side and Shiite allies of Asad, Lebanese Hizballah and Iran
on the other (Geneive 2011) (BBC 2014, b). As the intensity of the conflict grew during 2012,
insurgent tactics became the Oppositions’ most effective strategy to combat the more powerful
conventional Syrian military. Yet neither side proved able to leverage comparative advantage in
the fight, so the conflict itself evolved into civil war (Peterson 2011). By June of 2012, Asad fully
abandoned conciliatory reforms and prepared his government for “real war,” thus committing
to overwhelming force and brutal oppression to retain power (BBC 2014, b). Despite the
organization of the SNC and outside assistance, the Opposition has remained fragmented
among a loosely connected network of former army soldiers, militias, terrorist groups
associated with Al-Qaeda and ISIL. The Opposition initially practiced guerrilla tactics, a
trademark of insurgency; however, by early 2012 the conflict had evolved to a conventional civil
war, with fixed positions and front lines to defend territory held by each side. Eventually,
radicals began to emerge as the more powerful among a wider umbrella of disparate groups.
Their motivation and tactics of employing maximum violence on the battlefield made them
more successful in comparison to the “moderate opposition” the international community
hoped would become the legitimate rulers of Syria. As such, ISIL began to make a name for
itself as one of the premier jihadist groups fighting Asad. With well trained, battle hardened
fighters from across the globe, tech and public relations savvy media professionals and strong
willed leadership, their battlefield and recruiting successes surged (al-Hayat 2012) (De Kerchove
2014).
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A November 2012 effort in Qatar tried to unify the Opposition forces at a meeting held
by the SNC, however the more radical and Islamist forces refused attendance (USA Today
2012). As the civil war raged, into 2013, reports of chemical weapon usage by the regime began
to surface. In April 2013, the U.S. and Britain demanded an investigation into chemical weapon
attacks but the events did not lead to international military intervention that could’ve toppled
the regime (Farley 2013). In fact, the regime of Bashar al-Asad remains advantaged by its strong
conventional military and international backers. As of 2014, neither side has proved capable of
gaining the upper hand, and the fighting continued to grind on with indication of abating (BBC
2014, b).

The Vain Hope of Arab Spring Revolutionaries
The case of Syria has followed the similarly inspired revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen
and Libya but has become one of the most geo-politically important and generally most
devastating of the Arab Spring uprisings. These successful Arab Spring revolutions initially
inspired the Syrian people themselves to rise up, through minor forms of political protest,
which progressively elevated to violence (Wieland 2011). Although each country’s fate
manifested differently, with varying degrees of violence, the inspirations for revolutionary
actions were all strikingly similar and the events that unfolded were mutually constitutive. In
nearly all Middle Eastern nations, populations mobilized against the institutionalized oppression
of authoritarian regimes, and demanded more freedom and better economic opportunities.
The promised benefit of these revolutions, however, has eluded most Arab Spring states, even
though many uprisings have left some authoritarian leaders ousted in their wake. Clearly, Egypt
and Tunisia experienced relatively less violent revolutionary transitions of power; even though
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a deferred counterrevolution seems to have brought Egypt’s military back to power, at the
expense of the democratically elected Muslim Brotherhood. Unlike the cases of Egypt and
Tunisia, where violence was relatively minimal for revolutionary societies, Syria has followed
the path of Libya, since its leadership seems willing to use total war, thus far more successfully,
in its bid to retain power. Nevertheless, the progression of social mobilization for revolutionary
goals was similar in each case: popular protests, fueled in large part by social media (Wieland
2011). There is also no doubt the Arab Spring represents a transitive social phenomenon that
has demonstrated the power of social mobilization and collective action in the evolving modern
environment of new technology and communication.
This emergent phenomenon is well captured in Manuel Castells 2012 book, Networks of
Outrage and Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. In this work, Castells stakes out a
theory of movements, in that they can emerge out of online networks that empower society to
challenge global powers of government, big business and other material forces that have
typically dominated world affairs. By networking the masses through the Internet, he argues
these forces gain bargaining power through mass mobilization of online and real world
activism. This mass subversion and purposeful struggle to affect the norms and values of
society has become exponentially empowered through social media. As his title suggests,
“outrage and hope” become the emotions that are given strength through the medium of the
Internet, by which they are unleashed as powerful societal forces. Castells begins with the
example of Tunisia, by correctly arguing that it was not the initial act of civil disobedience that
gave rise to the successful revolutionary movement; rather, the means of the Internet itself
allowed for the emotions of outrage and hope to network the masses. Castells acknowledges
the “multidimensionality” of these movements, but upholds them as a primary causal
13

mechanism for these movements as social phenomena (2012). Castells book does a good job of
capturing the recent phenomenon whereby against all odds and expectations, mass protests
and when necessary, violent opposition movements, were able to overthrow or severely
weaken many dictators in a region rife with authoritarian tradition. The importance of social
media as a mutually constitutive force is important understanding events in Syria as part of a
wider regional phenomenon.
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Chapter Two: Toward a Theoretical Understanding of Revolutions
The theories used in the analysis of Syria’s turn to conflict draw heavily on pioneers in
the study of revolution and social movements. Charles Tilly is one of the leading scholars in the
field, and his resource mobilization theory provides a holistic model explaining the necessity of
tangible actions revolutionary movements must take in order to succeed. Tilly cast such
behavior as a rational pursuit, involving the mobilization of not just resources but people. Crane
Brinton’s use of analogy to increase understanding of revolutions as a process was integral to
understanding the steps at play in Syria’s own conflict. Theda Skocpol also contributed greatly
to theories of Social Revolutions and this analysis. Her use of structural functionalism to explain
the phenomenon of revolutions also provides a very complete understanding of the causes
behind revolutions and the process by which they culminate. David Easton’s work on Systems
Theory helps give a simplified model to understand Syria’s domestic sphere as a system
whereby inputs and outputs determine the sustainability of the system. The J-Curve theory and
explanations of relative deprivation also are drawn on extensively to explain the initial spark
behind “why men rebel.” Finally, the importance of war and violence is touched upon, and will
be addressed frequently throughout this work. Such great thinkers and many others will serve
to heavily influence the subsequent analysis.
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Resource Mobilization and the Rationalization of Collective Action
Charles Tilly and other pioneers of resource mobilization theory helped advance our
theoretical understanding of collective action by casting the phenomenon as rational behavior
within society. He also breaks with the frameworks of Ted Gurr and James Davies who
promoted aggregate theories of revolutions and singular causal mechanisms; preferring instead
to focus on the processes of mobilization structures of power and the links between both (Tilly,
1973, 436). This theoretical framework, and many of Tilly’s definitions, will heavily influence
this analysis. For Tilly, the rationality behind such collective behavior is rooted in its relative
success; that is to say, protest movements and even revolutionary movements do often force
change in society. And for Tilly, the success of such movements is directly correlated to
resource mobilization, i.e. the ability of the group to acquire and employ resources toward a
goal. Simple protests, rioting and mob behavior are unlikely to succeed, or garner the requisite
resources to force change on a government. These resources may be materiel, financial or
ideological, but the most important element is participation by a critical mass of individuals.
The ability to mobilize people for collective action is a powerful force within society. Even
oppressed individuals, or the masses without access to the ruling polity or institutionalized
influence, find themselves empowered when acting in numbers. Tilly’s theory differentiates
between simple protest actions or rebellious violence, and the collective action of events like
revolution. That is because the latter phenomenon incorporates a synthesis of resource
mobilization and social mobilization. The simple voicing of dissent and grievances is common in
society, but usually does not result in the direct action necessary to institute change. Tilly would
argue that resource mobilization, specifically, is what is necessary to create a formidable sociopolitical force.
16

In Charles Tilly’s work From Mobilization to Revolution (1977), Tilly explains collective action
and why it occurs. According to Tilly, collective action is the study of power and politics. His
book is an inherently normative study of social forces and is generally hostile to the heavyhanded exercise of power by governments. The work is equally sympathetic to collective action
of ordinary citizens. In his literature review, Tilly examined previous explanations of collective
action, or theories connected to the concept and for example, Karl Marx’s theoretical
knowledge was incorporated into Tilly’s thinking. Tilly would be remiss otherwise, since Marx’s
ideas proved powerful in the discipline of studying social movements and revolutions;
particularly so, since they had the normative impact of predicting (and likely causing) multiple
revolutions and rebellions. Marx, of course, centered his theory of collective action on class
conflict where the perpetual struggle between the ruling bourgeoisie and the ruled proletariat
class inevitably leads to revolution. Tilly acknowledged the power in class conflict and how
opposition emerges to ruling polities, yet he opted for a more multi-dimensional understanding
of revolutionary societies (1977, 2-1). By incorporating Emile Durkheim’s work, Tilly highlighted
how the division of labor in society destroyed social interaction and shared consciousness,
which in the end leads to the breakdown of society (1977, 2-7). In looking at John Stuart Mill,
Tilly noted that he took a more microeconomic approach to incentives that lead to collective
action. Where Mill also rejected assumptions of crowd action as irrational, and instead
emphasized the rational pursuit of interests (1977, 2-12). Max Weber’s model looked at
constitutive authorities that act on behalf of groups, and these groups derive their sources of
authority from traditional modes, rational-legal definitions of authority and finally charismatic
sources of authority (1977 2-19). Given all these influences, Tilly’s analysis is anti-Durkheimian,
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and more structured along a Marxist model that also incorporated an emphasis on belief
systems from Weber and a decision-making process formulated by Mills (1977, 1-9 to 1-16).
As stated earlier, Tilly attempted to synthesize causal and purposive models into his theory
in order to develop a more comprehensive explanation of collective action. He generally
defines causal mechanisms as the effect external forces have on the behavior of the group.
Where Marx’s influence comes in to play, is where Tilly asserts that social interaction is greatly
impacted by a groups’ relationship to the means of production. Tilly’s analysis, therefore, takes
a materialistic view of cause and effect. In defining the purposive, Tilly explains that the group
makes decisions based on set of rules and individual rationalization. This incorporates a bit of a
Millinian approach in that collective action is also driven by individual psychological
rationalization. Perhaps Tilly’s most important contribution to the theoretical understanding of
revolutions is his polity model. Here, Tilly creates definitions and demarcates the collective
forces acting within society. It is a static model of political interaction where a group of
contenders apply pooled resources to each other and to the government. Within this model, a
government is an organization, which controls the principle concentrated means of coercion
within a population. Contenders are any group who apply resources to influence the
government. This can be a member within the ruling polity or from the outside. A member is
part of a group of contenders who have routine, low-cost access to resources controlled by the
government, whereas, the polity consists of the members of the government. Challengers are
groups of contenders who do not have routine, low-cost access to government controlled
resources and a coalition is a set of contenders (members or challengers) that may even
cooperate with government elements to coordinate collective action with the goal of capturing
power and authority (1977,Ch 6-7).
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Tilly also introduces his mobilization model to his theoretical framework so that it includes
both organizations and how they interact. This model is mostly specific to contenders, since
they are the group applying resource mobilization to their strategy. Within this model you have
interests, organizations, mobilization, collective action and opportunity. Interests represent
gains and losses stemming from group interactions, and in the aggregate, they create the goals
of the organization. The organization itself depends on the structure of the group and
determines the groups’ capacity to act on its interests. Mobilization is the process by which a
group acquires collective control over the resources needed for action. Those resources may be
labor-power, goods, weapons, votes and any number of other things, just so long as they have
utility to the groups’ shared interests. Conversely, a decline in resource aggregation exhibits
demobilization. Collective action follows as people work together for a common interest.
Collective action is not just passive either; it constitutes an active application of tangible
resources toward a goal. Finally, Tilly emphasizes the importance of opportunity, defined as the
group’s relationship to the world around it. Opportunity can benefit either the contenders
within a society or the ruling polity (1977, 8). They serve as events or conditions to advantage
either side. This is important because often movements, like the ones in the Middle East, need
an opportunity to emerge.
These models help us understand why collective action occurs by highlighting that: 1.
Collective action costs something. 2. All contenders count costs. 3. Collective action brings
benefits, in the form of collective goods. 4. Contenders continuously weigh expected costs
against expected benefits. And 5. Both costs and benefits are uncertain because contenders
have imperfect information about the current state of the polity and all parties engage in
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strategic interaction. Contention for power thus links the mobilization model to the polity
model (1977, 5-1).
There are also different forms of contention: competitive, reactive and proactive. All
revolve around competition and the allocation of resources, as well as societal claims on these
resources. The repertoire, or tactics of collective action is extremely important to understanding
revolutionary societies. Repertoires have evolved over time but include: protests, strikes, civil
disobedience and violence in its many forms. In fact, Tilly prefers to use a broad definition of
violence that includes any use of physical force. Whereby the intent is to act collectively to
employ power. Often violence is incidental, occurring as a result of a demonstration. Other
times it is a tool, like repression of a government or terrorism against a government.
Contentious gatherings, such as demonstrations, strikes, protests etc. are not intrinsically
violent but they may serve as settings for violence. Violence occurs via the same political
processes that produce nonviolent collective action. But it makes it visible and more costly on
the object of the violence. Tilly uses definitions from other scholars but prefers a broad
definition of revolution – “the displacement of one set of power brokers over another.” He also
argues that a revolutionary outcome can occur without a revolutionary situation, and urges
scholars to focus on the process, not only the outcome of revolutions (Tilly 1977, 5-14).
Tilly also emphasizes the importance of historical analysis when studying collective
action. That is because collective action has not only evolved and changed with the times, it
has shaped the social power structures within societies and the way these power structures
relate to the means of production.
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The Anatomy of Revolutions
The classical “anatomy of a revolution,” as outlined by Crane Brinton in his book The
Anatomy of Revolution (1938), is fundamentally helpful to understanding the process of
revolutions and the revolutionary potential of the Syrian civil war. Should Syria culminate in
revolution, Brinton believes history shows that the course of the process may follow a
predictable trajectory. According to Brinton, revolutions begin with the decay of the old regime,
which ushers in the initial stages of revolution, and then the fall of the old regime. Although this
is usually a time of great hope and celebration, the following stages of building anew can
actually prove more difficult than even defeating the old regime. After the fall of the old regime
usually comes the brief honeymoon period and fleeting rule of the moderates, which eventually
gives way to “the accession of the extremists,” the rise of the radicals and the “reign of terror
and virtue.” Only after chaos and violence ensue does convalescence overtake society in what’s
called a “Thermidorean reaction,” a phrase coined by Brinton because of the move away from
radicalism that occurred during the month of “Thermidor” under the new French revolutionary
calendar. The final stage ushers in an era where society normalizes in accordance with the new
social and political order. This sequential explanation outlined a linear course of revolutions as
understood by Brinton. His analysis also invoked a metaphor that used the physical science’s
study of a fever or flu virus to very aptly describe the nature of revolutions. As such, revolutions
are like the flu, since they come on like a sickness, and are doomed to get worse before they
get better. His entire conceptual scheme, therefore, is a metaphor borrowed from the natural
sciences and pathology. This study will adhere to this conceptual understanding of revolutions
as a process that follows stages but acknowledges that such a neat linear chronology is not
always reflective of reality. As such, the situation unfolding in Syria today would still be
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considered in the nascent stages of revolutions, assuming it is in fact undergoing a revolution at
all. This is true even though the conflict began in 2011. Nevertheless, the existent rebellion and
insurgency still is closely comparable to the definition of a revolutions and Brinton’s conceptual
understanding of the revolutionary process. Syria has only progressed partially along this
revolutionary trajectory but is advanced past the phase where opposition elements have
adopted violence as the repertoire of last resort, in order to force the fall of the old regime. It is
also true that Syria’s “rise of the radicals” has occurred in a stage prior to the successful
destruction of the old regime. This has created conditions where such radicals have emerged
and culminated prior to an opposition victory, in a way enhancing the state of “multiple
sovereignty” Tilly has outlined. Such conditions highlight the diversity and complexity of
revolutionary societies.
In his detailed analysis of the stages of revolutions, Brinton reveals important points
that apply to the case of the Syrian conflict. Brinton astutely notes that pre-revolutionary
societies are usually economically progressive, not retrograde (Brinton, Ch.2 part II). Economic
misery exists in many states but doesn’t usually result in insurrections. Economic grievances
brought on by feelings of resentment towards the government for inhibiting society’s
actualization are a more likely indicator of revolutions. In most revolutionary societies, the
economy was previously prosperous; the citizens only turned against the government when
they felt government shortcomings or biased policies were against their economic interests
(1932 Ch.2 part II). Brinton also notes the importance of ideology by stating “no ideas, no
revolution (1932 Ch.2 part III, 49).” In speaking on the types of revolutionaries, Brinton
contends that moderates often are prominent in the early stage of revolutions but radicals
usually overtake them during the crisis stage (1932 Ch. 6 part III). These principles help explain
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the rise of ISIL, given their skillful use of radical Islam, force and fundamentalism to create a
powerful ideology. Although the Asad regime has yet to be deposed, their rise during the height
of the crisis stage should have been a predictable outcome of such a society, given the
revolutionary preconditions and accelerators that are to be detailed in later sections.

Systems Theory
Crane Brinton was one of the first theorists to liken revolutions to a sickness coming on
and overtaking society like a fever, similar to how a doctor studies a patient. However, later
theorists refined the understanding of society as a system. Such a framework of analysis makes
sickness or mechanical failure an adept analogy to our understanding of society. David Easton’s
1957 work The Analysis of Political Systems is one of the first attempts to explain society as a
self-sustaining system. His real world analogy follows a mechanical understanding of society as
a system of inputs and outputs; and although it is not the most complex or modern work within
the systems theory discipline its simplified model is beneficial to this adaptation to
revolutionary societies. His theory of society as a system is visionary because it gives
boundaries to the system of study and attempts to provide a blueprint for how society
operates. It also gives a sequential and cyclical explanation to how a political system functions.
Easton’s model contends that within any political system exist inputs such as demands and
supports, which the system must meet. This is because scarcity drives political life within the
system. Demands, therefore, are the raw input on which finished products, called decisions,
are made. So it follows that, if healthy, can adequately resolve this inherent dilemma of society
by producing outputs that satiate demand. However, demands and decisions could not exist
without support. Support represents the other input, which acts as legitimacy for the actors
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supporting the system. This concept of legitimacy is extremely important for governments to
operate, because without it, their support can wane and the whole system breaks down.
Support manifests itself overtly, but also passively through social order. The latter support may
not be tangible, but it is a valuable input nonetheless. Support is fed into the system related to
three objects: the community, the regime and the government. The community represents the
players within the game, while the regime makes the “rules of the game” and the government
functions as the bureaucracy. No political system can continue to operate unless its members
are willing to support the existence of a group that seeks to settle differences of promote
decisions through peaceful action in common.” This is so important because national unity and
the political community keep the political system going and confer the legitimacy essential to a
stable political system. The regime regulates the way demands are put into the system and
settled, which then leads to output. The government runs on the support and which it receives
through persuasion, consent, manipulation and coercion through the threat of force. The
government, therefore, processes the demands and negotiates conflict within the system.
These demands and supporting groups then stimulate competition within the political system
that lead to decisions or outputs. These outputs interact with the environment to produce
changes in society that are considered outcomes. Depending on this outcome, new demands or
supports may be generated within the political system. As such, a feedback loop is created and
the process becomes cyclical (1957).
Under this theory the process of inputs and outputs determines to stability of the
system. Interestingly, the system can function in a variety of different scenarios so long as the
ratio of demands and decisions are processed in an acceptable manner to those participating in
the system. For example, a large majority of the population may be unhappy, but if they’re
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making relatively few demands, and their support to the system is insignificant, then the
stability of the system can endure. Conversely, a small subset of the actors in society can
destabilize the system if their relative input is substantial. This process of inputs and outputs
must be balanced, so that expectations can be met and managed (1957).
Easton’s conceptual model of systems theory best describes the domestic sphere of
societal action, but the incorporation of international intervening variables even further
complicates the tenuous balance of inputs and outputs. Such consideration must be made for
the case of Syria. For example, when conflict between domestic law and international law come
into play, the illegitimacy of the state in the eyes of the international community can
undermine the strength of the regime domestically. Moreover, cases where a regimes activities
conflict with international law can sometimes compel international intervention in a state’s
domestic affairs. This has been the case in Syria, though not to the point where it has
threatened the integrity of the regime. Syria’s use of chemical weapons in 2013 crossed
President Obama’s threatened redline (Farley 2013). For a brief period, the world held its
breath while it waited for a response, with some anticipating punitive military action led by the
United States. Although such military intervention never materialized, a compromise was struck
in the United Nations, and Russia and the U.S. both helped broker the disarmament of Syria’s
chemical weapon stockpiles (OPCW 2013). Although this represented a small loss of brutal
military capability, Asad and Russia were able to avoid regime-changing military intervention
(Cunningham 2013). This incident was one of the most pivotal in the Syrian conflict and
represents both the strength and limitations of international law. On the one hand, Syria’s
violation of international law, through the use of chemical weapons could have given pretest
for military intervention. Military intervention, of course, did not occur and the regime remains
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in power. Nevertheless, the international community did compel Syria to destroy its chemical
weapon stockpile (Gearan 2013). The importance of international and domestic law will be
further expounded upon in later chapters.

The J-Curve – A Collective, Psychological Trigger for Revolt
“Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective economic
and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal (Davies 1962).” This
concise revelation by James Davies conveyed to the world a more simplified understanding of
what causes revolutions, and it has contributed greatly to the study of collective action. The
subtle genius of Davie’s theory is that it graphically and conceptually depicts a key variable that
reveals causation behind revolutions. But it is a counterintuitive point to understand that
revolutions are much more likely to occur after a period of progress rather than perpetual
decline or stagnation. People across the globe and across time have endured great hardships,
oppression, economic depravity and worse, yet revolutions are a relatively rare social
phenomenon. Therefore things being bad, as an isolated variable, cannot be considered causal
with regards to collective action or social mobilization. Rather, the threat of losing something
perceivably gained, is often much more psychologically devastating; and conversely, the
existential hope of forging a better life can even motivate radical behavior. As an early scholar
of revolutions, Alex de Tocqueville put it; “evils that are patiently endured when they seem
inevitable become intolerable once the idea of escape from them is suggested (Tocqueville
1858, 214).” This illusion by Tocqueville was the inspiration for Davies’ theory of revolutionary
mobilization. In short, Davis’ perception of quality of life is measured by people’s expectations,
which in turn affects their likelihood to revolt. The psychological concept of self-determination
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means that most people desire to continually improve upon their quality of life. This instinctual
desire for fulfillment is operationalized as “expected need satisfaction.” A person’s “actual need
satisfaction” in many ways is determined by the environment and society where they live.
Therefore, as the gap between expected needs and actual needs widens, the potential for
unrest becomes greater. According to Davies, revolutions are most likely to occur when the
expectation gap is largest and becomes intolerable (1962, 6).
This course is not inevitable however; therefore, the opportunity must present itself in
the more comprehensive manner Charles Tilly also describes. For Davies, a weakened
government can be evidenced by relaxation of oppressive institutions. This often serves as the
opening needed to inspire revolutionary mobilization. Davies specifically states that “it is

when the chains have been loosened somewhat, so they can be cast off without a high
probability of losing life, that people are put in a condition of proto-rebelliousness. I use
the term proto-rebelliousness because the mood of discontent may be dissipated
before a violent outbreak occurs. The causes for such dissipation may be natural or
social (including economic and political) (1962, 7).” This statement by Davies
acknowledges that the process of collective action within revolutions is a mutually
constitutive one.
Davies explanation of his J-Curve concept further progresses his theoretical
framework: “Although physical deprivation in some degree may be threatened on the
eve of all revolutions, it need not be the prime factor, as it surely was not in the
American Revolution of 1775 (1962, 6).” “The crucial factor is the vague or specific fear
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that ground gained over a long period of time will be quickly lost. This fear does not
generate if there is continued opportunity to satisfy continually emerging needs; it
generates when the existing government suppresses or is blamed for suppressing such
opportunity (1962, 8).” As we will examine in Syria, the process of reform, economic
prosperity and socio-political modernization created high expectations in Syria that
ultimately went unmet. Some modest, yet uneven gains were made in the first 8 years
after Bashar al-Asad came to power in 2001; however, his return to oppression in 2011
created conditions that threatened the Syrian people and sparked the society's instinct
for revolt.
The Primary Importance of War and Violence

In war torn, conflict-ridden society, one concept often holds true – systemic
violence often begets institutionalized violence. The works of Theda Skocpol and
Rosemary O’Kane, who both argued for the central importance of war and violence in
shaping revolutionary societies, captures this phenomenon. Although these academics
viewed the problem from slightly different vantage points, Both Skocpol and O’Kane
looked to revolutionary France, Russia and China for examples where the phenomenon of
radical rule emerged from revolutionary processes; and their findings are illustrative of similar
problems plaguing Syria. In France, the Jacobin political organization was instrumental in the
revolution and was responsible for the ensuing the reign of terror. They came to power at the
height of crisis and adopted a method of governance and bureaucracy that was more coercive
than administrative. Multiple departments and security organs were devised to defend against
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counter-revolutions, enforce new laws and control the flow of resources. Civil conflict raged as
challengers to the Jacobins fueled their justification of more radical and extreme methods. The
failure of the Jacobins to consolidate power through the reign of terror led to three successive
constitutions, which all failed, and eventually led to a coup by Napoleon and the rise of
authoritarianism. Whereas the Jacobins failed to retain power, the Bolsheviks succeeded. As in
France, civil rebellion led to terror and the establishment of internal security services, radical
communist policies and the virtual end to a money currency because inflation was so bad
(O’Kane 1995). Skocpol argued that the Jacobin’s failures were because of dogmatism and
different economic times, whereas the Bolsheviks could fall back on industry. But O’Kane
argues it was simply flexibility and the willingness to transition to a more realistic post “warcommunism” economy. The Jacobins weren’t as organized as the communists and relied solely
on coercion while failing at administration. Centralization of government and consolidation of
internal security services are important for regime consolidation but so is the development of
flexible economic, social and political policies. War and especially civil war during revolutions
can become a great mobilizing force, but only if those countries new leaders adequately direct
its power toward an efficient centralization of the state, rather than being overcome by it.
Where Robespierre failed to centralize, Lenin succeeded. In China, revolutionary leaders also
used war as a force to mobilize and centralize the communist state. State instrument of
coercion, as in other revolutions, were necessitated by civil conflict and the threat of foreign
war, which precipitated the terror. In China, state instruments of coercion expanded beyond
security into social and economic life. The Korean War in 1950 further radicalized state policies
and centralization. Even though the Chinese case began as an agricultural revolution, rapid
centralization fueled industrialization, as it did in Soviet Russia, which gave the state more
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economic power to consolidate. As seen in these examples, civil conflict and war act as a
radicalizing force that shapes the system of governance that emerges from the destruction of
the old state and the creation of a new state (O’Kane 1995) (Skocpol 1979).
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Chapter Three: Preconditions Fuel Syria’s Revolutionary Potential
In searching for a predictive theory of social science, it is tempting to seek a single causal
variable to explain the revolutions phenomena. Unlike the laws of nature, however, humans
consciously and determinably alter their reality, which means it is very unlikely we will ever be
able to point to a single unchangeable law that accurately predicts such a complex social
phenomenon as revolutions. Instead we must endeavor to continually reevaluate the causes of
collective action and what variables affect the intensity of such movements. Nevertheless,
determining what causes revolutions begins not only with the challengers to the regime, but
the regime itself. Therefore the following analysis will attempt to breakdown the anatomy of a
revolution and its essential elements in the early stages of the revolutionary process. In doing
so, we will hopefully shed light on what makes the case study of Syria revolutionary, and
eventually assess what characteristics remain absent to prevent a full revolutionary
transformation.
Social disorder is a concept best considered on a spectrum or continuum, since some
form of unrest is always evident in every society. In the world’s most stable governments,
expressions of social frustration are common; whereas countries exhibiting high levels of
violence, government rejection, social cleavages and economic downturn often trend toward
the most extreme end of the spectrum, that of revolution. Such forms of unrest, as discussed
earlier, are symptoms of a sickness within society; and such sickness can be readily identifiable
in revolutionary preconditions, even if these variables alone are not enough to cause or predict
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revolutions. Such preconditions can, however, compound upon each other to intensify the level
of social discord in a nation, and sometimes push social unrest toward extremism and
revolution (Greene 1999, 152). Such preconditions were in the making before Bashar al-Asad’s
rise to power, and then became exacerbated during his rule (BTI 2006, 2008, 2010). We also
must understand governments as a system in order to determine what makes them durable or
vulnerable. Preconditions to revolutions are not necessarily easy to identify; nevertheless, there
are certain characteristics of society and governments that make them more prone to
revolutionary mobilization. Recognizing these characteristics can help us better understand
revolutionary situations as they emerge, particularly the case of Syria. Such an endeavor begins
with the study the preconditions known to exist in societies prone to unrest and revolution.

Geographic Diffusion of Instability
Geographic isolation arguably makes countries better immune to revolutionary unrest.
This is because isolation often leaves a country’s society to the forces of its own selfdetermination, and they are usually less vulnerable to negative externalities. Isolation can also
bring positive social benefits on the domestic front since the military plays less of a role in
internal affairs. Conversely, states that are surrounded by other states and are in close contact
often succumb to the destabilizing forces that affect their neighbors. Such was also Samuel
Huntington’s determination in his work The Third Wave (1992). When looking at democratic
movements as “waves,” the potential for spillover of instability is most impactful in regions
where there is a patchwork of bordering and interconnected states. These geographic
conditions create communication networks that expand across nations and regions, which also
can compound the trans-national effect of revolutionary fervor (Greene 1999, 152).
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The geographic factor of isolation, while not the only variable, has contributed to social
stability and the peaceful evolution “toward social democracy without the historical
disjuncture’s represented by revolution.” Great Britain, Sweden, Ireland, the United States,
Canada, and New Zealand all represent nations where geographic isolation allowed for the
emergence of relatively stable and democratic political system. Conversely, states surrounding
revolutionary France in the 18th and 19th centuries were often vulnerable to the “demonstration
effect” and the spillover of instability, as evidenced by a period of near-continues war with
neighboring Prussia, Spain and Britain (Green 1999, 153). Syria clearly falls in the latter category
of nations vulnerable to externalities. Geographically, it finds itself nearly landlocked except for
a small strip of strategically important coastline on the Mediterranean. It sits adjacent to
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and of course Israel, borders of nations all arbitrarily drawn by
post-World War Western powers. The result is a smattering of religious, social, ethnic, tribal
and political divisions arrayed across grossly heterogeneous nation states. Looking even
broader, Syria itself sits at the heart of a very troubled region where dysfunction and stark
divisions have been controlled under systems of authoritarianism. Aside from Turkey, Syria and
its neighbors have historically trended toward authoritarian government as the only systems
able to forcefully able to traditionally bring order. Syria itself has had to contend with the
troubles of unifying a heterogeneous nation while surviving the negative externalities of the
dangerous neighborhood. Authoritarianism maintained stability for a while, but created a
system whereby the legitimacy of the state rested on personal dictatorship and instruments of
oppression (CIA Factbook). Syria was not the only dictatorship to emerge; a whole host of
Middle Eastern states fell to authoritarian models in search of stability and security. However,
as we have seen with the Arab Spring, the façade of legitimacy is thin in these societies. The
33

phenomenon of the Arab Spring did not exhibit raised social consciousness in a vacuum of
isolated nation states; it sparked revolutionary fervor that permeated nearly all of the
authoritarian nations across the region. In fact, each Arab Spring dictatorship to fall lacked
geographic isolation, and succumbed to such impactful externalities. Geographic isolation alone
does not make states immune to unrest; but it is clear states that are not isolated tend to
become more vulnerable to the flow of ideas, unrest and even violence. This cross-border social
interaction can help create preconditions for instability. The geographic diffusion of ideas and
instability have likely tested the legitimacy of the Syrian state and made it weaker as the
transnational forces of revolution strengthened (Pollack 2012). That is because proximity
between nations allows for a more vibrant exchange of ideas, closer communication and even
the flow of resources. Such factors contribute to the diffusion of revolutionary fervor across
borders, and help explain the Arab Spring as a regional phenomenon (Greene 1999, 152).

Diverse Demographics and Cultural Cleavages
Demography is also perhaps the most commonly cited precondition of Syria’s upheaval,
but is realistically more of a contributing, vice primary factor. Disproportionate youth ratios,
sectarian policies, minority rule, race, ethnicity and religion are all potential drivers of unrest in
systemically unstable societies. Population growth on its own is not an indicator of impending
social unrest but does create pressure on the government and society to provide enough
resources to go around. If societies’ resources can keep pace with population growth and
perceivably be allocated fairly, then stability is likely to persist. However, a sharp rise in scarcity
often portends unrest, especially if the economic inequities within society are exacerbated
(Davies 1962, 13). This is true especially when population growth leads to a “youth bulge”
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where unemployment and a lack of opportunities in particular affect the younger generation
disproportionately. In Syria’s case, ethnic and religious demographics have partially helped
determined the inequitable allocation of resources, an effect only compounded by population
growth and scarcity (Matar 2012). This is because the Asad regime, for decades, allocated
resources in a bias manner that caused resentment among large cross sections of society. This
sectarian bias by Asad resulted in outrage among the have-nots in Syrian society. The market
driven reforms undertaken by Asad were manipulated along political and religious preferences,
thus alienating the large majority of potential challengers, who also happened to be Sunnis.
Asad promoted private investment vice state-led centralization, liberalized capital, privatized
banking and liberalized customs duties, all in effort to make Syria more economically viable and
strong; however, the majority of these reforms mostly benefited his crony class of insiders and
his Alawite religious minority (BTI 2003). Ultimately, these reforms were unaccompanied by
real social reforms that would’ve helped the majority of Sunni Syrians who sought a more
egalitarian economic order, unemployment alleviation, poverty reduction and other social
programs (BTI 2006). The result was unmet expectations by a majority of Sunni Syrians and
preferential treatment for the crony class and minority Alawites (Matar 2012). Unmet
expectations from the economic downturn in 2008, coupled with biased sectarian policies,
created fertile ground for a turn to unrest (Davies 1962).

Economic and Social Reform Raises Expectations
As addressed in prior sections, under the rule of Bashar al-Asad, the government began
to introduce economic and some political reforms intended to modernize the Syrian sociopolitical system (BTI 2003, 1). Asad set out to decrease the country’s reliance on oil revenue
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while transitioning to a more diversified market economy. These reforms were initially met with
the hope that they’d bring economic prosperity and a more open market system. However, by
2006 Syria remained an authoritarian regime with a state-dominated economy. Although
reformist segments of the Syrian elite embraced new market driven policies and some social
reform, the regime was determined not to sacrifice stability, and as such, never fully
consolidated the policy changes that would transform Syria’s socio-economic system. Some
rudimentary introduction of market –oriented economic changes have occurred, as have some
commitment to more liberal international trade agreements; however, these changes have
proceeded cautiously. More importantly, they have not been met with increased
democratization (BTI 2006, 1-5). By 2008, Asad’s economic policies allowed for moderate
economic growth but failed to result in real market economy reforms or an end to
authoritarianism. Instead, crony capitalism reigned and the successful sectors of the private
economy continued to be dominated by regime insiders and members of the religious minority.
The regime’s policies sought to establish a “social market economy” but instead returned to a
reliance on hydrocarbon rents, subsidization of public sector companies and the continuance of
social benefit schemes vice effectively regulating the market (BTI 2008, 1-3).
This faux transformation and economic mismanagement eventually forced the regime
to begin running large budget deficits, whereas the 30-year rule of Hafiz witnessed primarily a
commercial surplus (Mahamid 2013). The shift to economic downturn in Syria, in part, began to
create the preconditions for the eventual emergence of systemic social unrest. Large amounts
of foreign debt, rising rates of inflation, trade imbalances and unemployment all acted as
bellwethers to poor economic performance and potential drivers of unrest. When speaking of
preconditions, James Davies captures conceptually explains the revolutionary potential in Syria
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with his J-Curve model (1962). As he correctly asserts, economic depravity alone is not enough
to fuel unrest, yet downturn after a period of rising expectations threatens the quality of life
society has come to expect. This phenomenon is most potent when fueled with a sharp reversal
of economic fortunes, which threaten societies’ way of life and their expectation of continued
gains. Given the regimes public commitment to economic progress inducing reforms, the
political consciousness of its citizens was effectively heightened. In the end, the regime’s failure
to meet those expectations created conditions for unrest beyond what would exist under
conditions previously (Greene 1999, 139).
The religious cleavages addressed previously generated resentment, which were
exacerbated by the biased and uneven economic development from the first eight years of
Asad’s rule. As addressed by Davies and Toqueville, poverty alone is not enough to inspire
rebellion. That is because contrary to popular beliefs, poverty and economic despair are not
common sources of unrest in the model of sustainable social mobilization that cause revolution.
Such conditions breed a psychological sense of fatalism and hopelessness regarding their plight.
Moreover, these populations have no resources to commit to such collective action. Rather,
economic change that threatens the relative financial gains or their quality of life can often
inspire rebellion. This type of relative deprivation is common among revolutionary societies. In
contrast to perpetually deprived societies, those with rapid economic transformations or
modernization often react radically to unexpected shocks to the economy, especially those that
upset the societal balance of the system or perceivably threaten their gains. A transition to
capitalism, rapid industrialization, urbanization, and even modernization can often render the
old economic and social order anachronistic. Such changes can trigger conflict over resources if
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they seem to threaten the livelihood of certain groups; and economic and social shocks often
create a recipe for disorder (Greene 1999, 139).
The rapid modernization campaign by the Shah of Iran during the 1960s and 1970s is
comparable to Bashar al-Asad’s modernization campaign during which both generated
untenable expectations and created economic progress that outpaced social and political
reforms. The susceptibility of an economic system to disorder is therefore highest where the
structural foundations of that economy are most in flux and the political economy is corrupt
and biased. Both conditions create a higher likelihood of social frustration and generate fears
that manifest as collective action (Greene 1999, 166). Such conditions contributed to Syria’s
slide to unrest.

Political Adaptation, or Lack Thereof
Revolutionary potential also inversely relates to the political legitimacy of government
(Greene 1999, 168). This means that the legitimacy of the state is dependent on the evolving
and growing political expectations of its people. A systems theory analysis by inputs and
outputs simply states that the quantifiable level of popular support to a regime must be enough
to sustain that government’s legitimacy. There is no magic formula or political system known to
sustain that level of legitimacy, rather, it is a continuing exchange whereby the state and
society interact. For example, economic development increases social mobility within a society,
thus expanding the social and political consciousness of a population. And these changes can
help create a broader, socially mobile class, which in turn heightens the demand of political
representation and participation. This is where authoritarian, oligarchical crony class
governments like the Syrian regime run into trouble. Their style of rule is often based on a
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small, exclusive polity that exercises authority through oppression and control. This leaves a
large, albeit suppressed, pool of potential challengers in waiting that can prove extremely
problematic if activated. These governments are often unresponsive to the public and forbid
participation in active political institutions, thus creating an exclusionary society. However,
modernization and industrialization increase the percentage of socially conscious members of
society, who in turn demand more political participation; this can ultimately cause such
segments of a population to clash with governments whose foundation of legitimacy is small
and exclusive. Therefore, governments based on such ruling polities often succumb to waning
legitimacy in the face of rising political demands. This can result in a failure of political
adaptation, which creates a systemic imbalance where the conditions are ripe for the rise of
contentious politics, even revolution (Greene 1999, 168). This turn to systemic imbalance
happens most often when economic change, social mobility and the development of new
representative institutions evolve rapidly but are unmet with political freedoms. In such
societies where the existing political system fails to adapt and accommodate the population,
legitimacy suffers. In such societies where political demands are rapidly increasing actions such
as: suffrage reform, the legalization of trade-union activities and the states provision of welfare
services can accommodate rising demands and demonstrate the political system’s ability to
adapt. If such a situation unfolds, and the existing political system fails to enact genuine,
incremental reforms, then the population may turn to contentious politics and varying degrees
of popular mobilization, depending on the severity of the systemic imbalance. In the case of
Syria, Bashar’s market reforms were neither genuine nor adequate in the eyes of the populace
(Matar 2012) (Greene 1999, 167).
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The Arab Spring uprisings across the Middle East clearly helped trigger Syria’s initial
protest movement, but there were many preconditions that allowed societies’ social
frustrations to explode as such a powerful force. Geography, demography, economic conditions
and failed political adaptation all served to create a powder keg for Syrian society. Such
preconditions exposed structural weaknesses in the fabric of Syrian society that contributed to
the decay of the old regime and helped create an environment ripe for collective action and
violent revolutionary mobilization. To a degree, anti-regime collective action is dependent on
the severity of this systemic imbalance, which fuels social disorder. Such a conceptual
understanding of the Syrian conflict will help us understand the conditions that led to Syria’s
unrest, and whether they were sufficient enough to thrust Syria into a revolutionary state.
More importantly, a detailed study of the revolutionary environment itself will help us
understand what the future holds for Syria.
To recap, revolutionary potential is highest in in heterogeneous societies where ethnic,
religious and linguistic cleavages are most pronounced. Societies where economic resources
consolidate among the elite can also create a resentful, revolutionary population whose
political consciousness tend to focus on the illegitimacy of the system that is not benefiting
them, creating a state of proto-rebelliousness. Uneven economic and social development often
provides social conditions ripe for instability and unrest. Moreover, such economic and social
progress often serves as a source of instability if it is perceived as being suppressed by a biased
regime or if progress is deemed as threatened (Greene 1999, 178).
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The Making of Revolutionary Preconditions Under Hafiz al-Asad
Although the preconditions for revolution have already been identified, the following
two sections will provide a detailed narrative of the system created under the Asad’s rule and
how revolutionary preconditions emerged. Bashar al-Asad’s father Hafiz, helped create the
modern Syrian state and thus remade the structure of Syrian society in a new social, political
and economic order. The emergence of the Baath party in 1963 and the Asad regime’s rise to
power in 1970 enshrined pan-Arabism, anti-imperialism and socialism into a distinct secular
ideology that at first appealed to lower class and marginalized communities. These “isms”
provided pillars of stability for the regime since they provided ideological foundations for the
system of government, but also social distractions from that government’s failures. However, as
he consolidated his authoritarian rule, Hafiz built systemic inequities into Syria’s political system
that favored his family, his sect and inner circle. This created a minoritarian system where the
instruments of government were in the hands of a loyal cadre of Hafiz’s allies. These policies
allowed the regime to prove durable under a quasi police state but created a system where
revolutionary preconditions left the potential for unrest dormant (Brisco 2012, 9-10).
Hafiz ruled Syria from 1971-2000 and during his nearly three-decade reign, he
consolidated his own brand of an authoritarian political system. The secular Baath party
became the leading and only legal party, which filled out the expansive bureaucracy charged to
tightly control the emergent faux socialist economy. Under Hafiz, the state’s pillars of
legitimacy came to rest on populist institution building, nationalism and Arabism, the latter of
which was an effective state strategy to deflect attention from state inadequacies and the
largely Alawite minority rule over the country. Instead of the population lamenting Hafiz’s
oppression and minoritarianism, much of the state’s problems were projected on Israel.
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Despite the grand egalitarian designs of the Arab-Socialist Baathist platform, the nation quickly
reverted to an authoritarian security state obsessed with building itself as a military power.
These pillars of the state’s ideology became useful tools of the dictatorship to manipulate the
masses, deflect criticism and tighten the ruling Asad family’s grip on power (Brisco 2012, 10).
The legitimacy of the state, however, became tied to the party and the cult of personality
surrounding Asad. The regime’s legitimacy, therefore, was reinforced through oppression and
control. Rents from oil revenues allowed the state to centralize control over resources and
dramatically expand the public sector, which fueled the faux socialist system and cemented the
authoritarian architecture of government. The regime tightly controlled the economy, which
the public sector dominated. This allowed Hafiz to create a “durable network of economic and
political allegiance.” In this manner, the state-centered socialist economy enmeshed with the
corrupt cronyism, which favored a very selective cadre of Baath Party associates and a few from
the smaller private sector (Brisco 2012, 12).
Under Hafiz, Syria’s political economy became a dangerous brand of exclusiveness and
sectarianism. Corruption and cronyism are common among Mideast autocracies, but the added
element of minority sect rule created a delicate balance to maintain, since the large majority
pool of potential challengers already had the foundations for a unifying ideology – their
common Sunni religion. This, in turn, necessitated a strict and oppressive system of
government. Nevertheless, the authoritarian architecture Hafiz created proved resilient for four
decades; which begs the question, why now? For those four decades, Syria functioned as a
police state where oppression was the foundation of stability and the cost of rebellion
outweighed the perceived benefits. In this type of system, there resides an extremely small
polity at the top, so any opening reveals weakness that the masses and a potential pool
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challengers-in-waiting can emerge to exploit; a fact Hafiz understood well. Nevertheless, this
fact reveals the tenuous state of legitimacy that the regime had to rely significantly on
oppressive control (CIA Factbook) (BBC 2014, a).
In the 1970’s, opposition movements began to rise against the unfair and exclusive
policies created under Hafiz, and against his authoritarian rule. The Muslim Brotherhood
emerged as one of the first Sunni Islamist threats to the secular socialist regime. Other
opposition groups, in the early 1980s, joined under an umbrella group called the Islamic Front
with the goal of overthrowing the regime. They were motivated by the favoritism and
corruption of the regime and emboldened in the wake of a severe economic crisis. These
opposition groups, similar to today, emerged from strongholds in Aleppo, Homs and Hama, and
in 1982 militants took control of parts of Hama. The regime responded with overwhelming and
deadly force, decimating the entire city and killing nearly 10,000 people (BBC 2014, a). This
event showed the regime’s reliance on force and loyalty from the military (Kifner 1982).
Unsurprisingly, the demonstration of brutality also led the regime to become more repressive
and authoritarian (Brisco 2012, 13). History in this case can be illustrative. The policies of Hafiz
during the 1980’s demonstrated that there would be no room for compromise and the regime
would use extreme measures against any opponents. It also revealed the relative weakness of
the nascent opposition to overwhelming brute force. On one hand, the Muslim Brotherhood
and other opposition movements did not enjoy popular support or the cross-cutting alliances
necessary to challenge the regime successfully. Moreover, events in Syria had unfolded in
isolation to the rest of world affairs. Unlike the movement of 2011, events in Hama did not
benefit from the momentum built by the Arab Spring protests and the successful
empowerment by new technology and social media that current events successfully
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demonstrated. The rebelling groups of 1982 also represented a minority within the greater
Sunni majority and were snuffed out before they were able to mobilize a larger following. On
the other hand, the repressive policies of Hafiz prevented opposition movements from
organizing to gain popularity, so they remained small in number, geographically isolated and
unable to recruit more members. This allowed Hafiz to target and eliminate opponents to his
rule and deter future challengers (Kifner 1982).
Such a strategy was similarly pursued by Hafiz’s son 30 years later but as we will see
Bashar had to contend with a much larger, broader and stronger popular movement, and in the
face of such opposition he initially wavered between accommodation and the devastating force
necessary to crush the opposition. Moreover, he was more vulnerable to international norms
and pressure in light of the effects social media had in popularizing the next protest movement
witnessed in the anti-authoritarian Arab Spring movement. But before Bashar’s rise to power,
his father would have to handedly deal with subsequent more crises.
In the second half of the 1980’s a severe drop in oil prices nearly collapsed Syria’s statecentered economy. This brought on a crisis that would reveal the early signs of instability and
inherent weaknesses in the Syrian economic system. The emergent economic crisis exposed
structural problems in the heavily bloated and subsidized public sector, which was dependent
on oil profits. This shock forced Hafez to initiate a limited liberalization campaign, in a process
called intifah in Arabic, which translated as an “opening” of the economy. This opening began a
shift to where the private sector would become a more formally institutionalized sector of the
economy and the regime planned to eventually allow both the private and public sector to
become complementary. Nevertheless, it was of course gradual and tightly controlled. This
transition did not benefit all of Syria’s population, however, and in many ways maintained the
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economic structure, which benefited the crony class of Alawites and business partners, as well
as former public servants and other families loyal to Asad. In fact, this new class of business
elite controlled the majority of public and private sector contracts, as well as the energy
resources. This crony class amounted to a mere one percent of the economy, hardly indicative
of a transition to market economy that would bring pluralist liberalization (Matar 2012, 1-6).
The crony private sector did, however, become extremely powerful as an extension of the
regime, since it served to replace the old socialist structure with a reorganized hybrid
public/private system that retained the tight centralization of resources and power (Matar
2012, 1-6).
The reason Hafiz’s policies failed to bring broader social and economic reforms to the
general populace is because there was a good amount of top-down institutional resistance
(including his own) built up to any form of liberalization, so the corrupt and privileged elites
made sure the control of resources remained within their grasp. Future periodic attempts at
liberalization also mostly failed to lead to any significant reform, especially as Hafiz’s reign
neared the end. The networks close to the family continued to monopolize large sections of the
economy, which cemented their power and perpetuated the cycle of corruption. The
centralized control of these resources allowed the system to begin an evolution away from a
socialist economy, while continuing to enmesh itself with the institutions of government, the
security apparatus’ and business elite (Mahamid 2013) (BTI 2008, 19).
Such a “minoritarian” model alienated and excluded the vast Sunni majority of the
country and the sectarianism institutionalized in the socio-political and economic system added
to society’s frustration over the authoritarian model of a centralized and exclusive political
economy. Nevertheless, Syria’s Sunni majority, and the large pool of potential challengers to
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the regime, remained suppressed and largely acquiescent (Brisco 2012, 9). This strategy
increased the Baathist regimes control because access to resources became synonymous with
loyalty to the regime. Controlled corruption also became a hallmark of the regime’s political
economy and was actually a self-perpetuating characteristic of its bureaucracy since these
patronage networks were largely dependent on regime loyalty. The process by which Hafiz
intertwined the political elite and business elite created endemic corruption and most Syrians
never benefited from the liberalization policies. In the end, Hafiz’s token economic reforms
mostly benefited the already empowered elite. The culmination of his three decades of rule left
his son, Bashar, with a political economy based on favoritism for the minority Alawites and
some closely linked families.

Bashar’s Opening Unleashes Revolutionary Potential
Bashar reluctantly ascended to power after his father’s death in 2000. His eldest brother
Bassel perished in a car accident six years earlier, which set Bashar up as next in line to inherit
the presidency. Bashar had been working as an Ophthalmologist in England before he was
summoned back to Damascus and groomed for succession (BBC 2014, b). As a reluctant
successor, Bashar’s assumption of power came with many challenges. The economic system of
Syria that his father Hafiz al-Asad left him with, had arguably become unsustainable by the time
Bashar took over in 2000. Upon his accession of power, Bashar recognized that demographic
growth, combined with the decline of the oil economy, created a demand for resources that his
socialist economy could not meet. Most sectors of the economy were suffering, and the
system was propped up primarily by oil rents and foreign aid, both of which were in decline (BTI
2012, 18). Faced with these structural economic challenges, Bashar and his inner circle sought
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to introduce a new cadre of government technocrats to oversee market reforms. Such an
undertaking meant retiring older officials and introducing a new, better-educated and less
ideological generation. This reform would greatly outpace the initiatives of his father but were
still meant to proceed slowly and carefully enough so as to not threaten vested interests of the
ruling class or its grip on power. Like his father, Bashar was cautious, and approached any plans
for liberalization with great care. Nevertheless, necessity compelled him to enact
unprecedented reforms in order to move toward a more sustainable and diversified market
economy. This, he calculated, would help lead his country away from the structural weaknesses
of the decaying socialist system (BTI 2012, 18-21).
In the first ten years of his rule, Bashar did make some significant strides toward market
transformation, outpacing the halting reforms of his father. Originally, he even looked to the
West to open up trade and economic ties. However, the events of September 11th, 2001 meant
Syria had to move away from the West and toward Asia, Russia, Latin America and regional
neighbors. Some of these nations actually turned out to be better fitting partners, since their
political systems and global political alignment was more accepting of authoritarian states
deemed pariahs by the U.S. The opening of trade and ties helped usher reforms forward. After
four years of rule under Bashar, private banks emerged and stock markets were created. A
currency exchange was also legalized. This and other liberalizing measures accelerated the
move to a system where the private sector economy became equal to the public sector. But
again, just like under his father, the reforms were tightly managed, and only a select group
close to the regime benefited, particularly the minority Alawites (Matar 2012, 1-6).
Syria’s political economy, therefore, remained tightly centralized and corrupt. Despite
the accelerated market reforms it remained a structurally exclusionary and minoritarian model.
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Its socio-economic transformation mostly benefited the emergent class of crony capitalists
connected to the regime. The market reforms, however, did bring more openness to the
economy and created a larger politically conscious pool of economic participants, even if the
minority model excluded them still. Such openness likely made many Syrian citizens more
conscious of the changes their economy was undergoing and more sensitive to its failures.
According to The Arab Human Development Report, Syria’s income inequality rose faster than
any other Arab state in the few years after Bashar took over the presidency (UNDP 2014) (BTI
2012). This inequality would fuel resentment among a population who perceived corruption,
sectarian bias and regime offenses to be stifling their quality of life. By the year 2010, GDP
growth dropped to 3.2 percent, still positive, but lower than the mean average reflected in the
three prior years at 5.4%. The state also was forced to radically decrease its dependency on oil
revenue, dropping from 70% around the turn of the millennium to just 20% in 2011 (BTI 2012).
Such massive structural changes to any nations’ economy help contribute to instability,
especially when such economic inputs are not offset by other sources of revenue. And if such a
nations’ political structure destabilizes, the resulting legitimacy deficit can threaten the entire
state system (BTI 2012, 12-14). In Syria’s case, market reforms put it on a path to a more open
and sustainable economy; however, such a move also decreased the centralized control of the
regime. This unleashed a number of new demands from contenders on the outside and
potential challengers to the regime that sought to benefit from the opening of the economy.
These demands and expectations, however, went unmet. As we will see, these unmet
expectations and the regime’s legitimacy deficit provided a key preconditions for the nation’s
revolutionary potential.
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Market reforms also led to a decrease in public benefits, which had become pervasive
to the point of dependence since the Baath party founded a socialist state. Education,
healthcare, retirement, public housing, labor rights, subsidized food and other entitlements saw
a significant funding reduction over the last 15 years prior to the 2011 unrest, and such
austerity measures were accelerated primarily under Bashar’s reign. The erosion of funding to
these entitlements, and gradual shift to the marketplace left many regime outsiders worse off
while those close to the regime remained affluent. Those unable to pay for the previously
subsidized services struggled to get health care and education. Most jobs in the middle class
paid only enough for subsistence living, which caused most family members to have to work
multiple jobs. Official unemployment statistics amounted to less than 10% but realistically were
much higher, possibly nearing 25%. Underemployment was also extremely problematic and hit
the youth population hard. Often youths are most restless and prone to unrest in any society;
therefore, this problem in particular compounded Syria’s dangerous economic conditions (BTI
2012, 15).
Upon Bashar’s assumption of power came the ironically named “Damascus spring”
where a civil society movement of pro-democracy clubs was allowed to meet and organize. The
regime actually wavered between oppression of such groups but also tolerated some clubs and
especially organizations that emphasized volunteerism, even those partnering with NGOs. The
semi-acceptance of civil society organizations was also considered beneficial since they
encouraged non-state groups to assume responsibilities of welfare institutions that were being
drawn back. Some of these civil society organizations actually supported pro-democracy
debates and were surprisingly tolerated by the regime. Such tolerance allowed for the gradual
development of ideas and organizations that would eventually challenge the regime. As
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recessionary conditions hit the Syrian state, Bashar attempted a policy of opening in order to
appease the populace. These socio-political reforms were meant to assuage frustration with the
government but had the dual effect of raising the population’s social consciousness thus
enabling the expression of political frustrations toward the government. Asad went so far as to
relax oppressive policies of the security forces, allowed for some political debate and criticism
of the government, so long as these discussions stayed within certain boundaries. Islamic
groups and charities were also encouraged, which relieved some of the dependence on state
welfare and a spurred a more progressive socialization of Syria’s intellectual and middle class.
As a result of reforms and the erosion of state dependence, civil society institutions such as the
family, wider kin and religious networks became strengthened, while state integration and
control decreased (BTI, 2012, 18). The net result was a rising social consciousness within
society (BTI 2012, 6) (Wieland 2011).
Given these reforms and the light transformation tolerated by Asad, over the last
decade, the Baathist socialist rule moderated somewhat. However, these evolving class lines
reorganized based on the same old political and sectarian, affiliations. Social mobility did
increase, as did the standard of living; yet, inequality raised dramatically and simply led
economic class structures to be reordered based on the individual’s access to state resources.
The new changes to the political economy only allowed state elite to enrich themselves, while
the middle class found itself under attack. The erosion of entitlements and the inequalities
inherent in the situation created by the new class of crony capitalists undermined social
mobility much of Syrian’s expected and stirred resentment among the “have-nots” of society.
As of 2008, rent from oil production slumped, as did foreign aid, and the Syrian economy
became even more dependent on it’s capitalist transformation as the only method to create a
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prosperous and sustainable economic system. This spurred liberalization of investment laws
and an influx of foreign investment from gulf countries. The foreign investment, however, only
partially offset the loss of oil rents and aid (BTI 2012, 17). This consequently brought
unintended foreign influences into the economic and civil society. In 2009, Syrian officials even
partially opened up to the West, as top U.S. State Department officials visited Damascus and
urged liberalization of the state controlled economy. During that time, Bashar enacted even
more economic and social reforms by launching the first Syrian state stock market and releasing
some pro-democracy advocates from prison (BBC 2014, b). As a result of these dramatic
transformations in Syria’s economy, the new social and political environment exposed
structural vulnerabilities in the authoritarian regime and triggered previously dormant
preconditions. Much like the examples of Pahvlavi Iran and early 20th century Russia, failure to
adapt to evolving social demands, while offering disingenuous openness can often act as a
precondition for revolutionary mobilization, particularly in deeply oppressive societies.
The pace of these reforms, and growing expectations, eventually exceeded Bashar’s
ability to retain the level of economic and social control enjoyed under the hybrid authoritarian
and socialist system. It instead exacerbated and exposed systemic imbalances between the
ruling party and a large pool of potential challengers. These challengers, as witnessed in 2011,
came to be represented by the majority Sunni community and those left out of system of
patronage and cronyism. According to the Netherland’s Institute for International Relations,
“deep economic deprivation, authoritarian rule and elite capture of public policy, have created
a pressure cooker effect (Brisco 2012, 64).” In other words, the systemic imbalance created by
the regime provided an important precondition to revolution, and a system ripe for revolution.
The corrupt economy, unemployment and unequal distribution of resources provided strong
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incentive for social mobilization on a revolutionary scale. It only needed a spark. This spark was
to come in the form of the Arab Spring (Fearon 2013) (Brisco 2012, 15-17).

52

Chapter Four: Accelerators Fan the Flames of Revolution
Preconditions provide the tinder for rebellion, but accelerators are the intervening
variables that fan the flames of revolutionary mobilization. Preconditions and accelerators
essentially help us understand what societal and systemic circumstances lead to revolutions.
Revealing such causal mechanisms will help us understand under what conditions revolutions
are more likely to “come;” whereas, later sections will address in greater detail characteristics
of revolutions that give them better probability of success or failure. (Greene 1999, 133).
Despite the important role played by accelerators, there can be no single point of causation;
instead, we can point to correlative indicators that act as intervening variables in concert with
existing environmental preconditions. These accelerators are events that occur at specific
points in time and serve a cohesive function to mobilize groups of challengers in a society
(Greene 1999, 133). Accelerators bring together groups of people with shared values and lead
them to collectively work toward a unified goal. If the government system fails to
accommodate this goal or goals, collective action can manifest as protest, rebellion or
revolution.
Accelerators, therefore, apply pressure to the state and can act to quickly erode a
states’ legitimacy. It is this legitimacy upon which all governments are dependent. This is a
partially subjective concept, but generally legitimacy correlates to the “attitudes of citizens as
they reflect on the personnel, policies, laws, and institutions of government.” Legitimacy is high
when citizens believe the government has the right to do what it does; whereas legitimacy is
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low when citizens believe the government is wrong in what it does. Therefore, deductively, we
can assume that in societies where legitimacy is low, there is a higher chance for revolution
(Greene 1999, 138). Accelerators act as the force to further erode state legitimacy. The civil
war, international isolation, and economic downturn have all drained the legitimacy of Syria’s
central government, even though it remains powerful and defiant. Such events and others will
be addressed more specifically in the following section.

Military Defeat
Military defeat is among the most commonly cited accelerators during revolutions since
it demoralizes a countries political leadership and degrades the monopoly of force within a
given society. Military defeat represents a failure and a great sacrifice of national resources in
blood, money, land, quality of life, prestige and sometimes rights. These things greatly affect
the legitimacy of a government, and correlate highly with causes of revolution (Greene 1999,
135). Aside from the revolutionary civil war, Syria had yet to experience outright military
defeat. The withdrawal from Lebanon in 2005 represented a passive imperial defeat, and an
immensely significant one for the countries’ regional status, alliances and domestic legitimacy.
The domestic and international pressure for Syria to end its 29-year military occupation began
after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Hariri, for which Syria was suspected of
having been responsible (Glackin 2014). Popular outrage against Syria’s suspected culpability
led to the “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon, which acted as a precursor to the revolutionary
movement that would come 7 years later. The popular movement sought the withdrawal of
Syria troops from the country and eventually brought down the pro-Syrian government in place
(Glacking 2014). Syria sought wiggle room in negotiating its status in the country, but eventually
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succumbed to external pressure by Arab States, the West and the U.N. to withdraw (Center for
Democracy in Lebanon 2005). Even Russia failed to exercise its veto power in the U.N. and
acquiesced to international pressure (Zaaroura 2005). The end of a near three-decade
occupation of Lebanon represented a defeat for Syria and an end to military domination that
greatly served its regional influence and power. But the 2005 withdrawal from Lebanon was
more of a non-violent, non-kinetic event, similarly akin to a loss of imperialist holdings. It did
not exact the type of hardship that would have resulted from actual conflict and a loss of lives,
resources and legitimacy that might precipitate a more accelerated slide to revolution.
Nevertheless, it represented a contributing factor to the weakened prestige of the Syria regime
in the region and the waning legitimacy of the new regime of Bashar al-Asad.

Economic Crises
Economic crises can also serve as an accelerator because such conditions’ lower the
government’s legitimacy and threaten the livelihood of the people. As discussed in previous
sections on preconditions, this is not to say poverty stricken societies are more likely to revolt,
in fact often these populations are often least disposed to organized collective action. Instead,
revolts are most likely to occur in developing economies where people feel their quality of life
or livelihood is threatened. You can’t lose what you don’t have. Therefore it is this phenomenon
of relative deprivation that causes unrest in societies where social mobility is high or has just
rapidly increased. Ted Gurr and James Davies, similarly argue for a theoretical foundation for
rebellion, whereby frustration over unmet expectations can lead to collective aggression and
rebellion (Gurr 1970). As such, sharp economic progress can cause the effect of rapidly raising
the level of political consciousness inside a society. Taking away associated benefits of this
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economic progress and the newly acquired social status creates strong motivation to rebel and
hold your government responsible (Davies 1962). Of course, not all economic downturns cause
revolutions. The business cycle of industrialized capitalist societies frequently cause stress on
governments, especially in democratic nations. But frequently these political and social systems
are stable enough and adept enough to weather the social upheaval caused by such economic
stressors because these nations have the democratic underpinnings to retain legitimacy and a
relatively successful capitalist history in which to put their faith. Therefore, the perceivably free
and popular means by which democratic societies allocate their scarce resources allows
stability to maintain, even in unsettling times. Rather, undemocratic and exclusive societies
often generate the resentment that leads to illegal and sometimes violent forms of contentious
politics. It is also important to note that global recessions or depressions often affect many
countries, even though only a small minority experience regime threatening political violence or
revolution. Therefore, economic crisis is more of a compounding factor common to most
revolutions and is most potent when the systemic economic preconditions are present and
then compounded by other intervening variables that exacerbate revolutionary fervor and
depreciate a government’s legitimacy (Greene 1999, 139). As in the case of Syria, economic
downturns prove most destabilizing in government systems that are already weak and in
unstable societies.
The hesitant free market reforms that Basher al-Asad pursued under his rule created the
environment for openness and the rise of politically conscious opposition but also created
conditions where his regime was increasingly vulnerable to the shock of economic downturn. In
fact, these macroeconomic policies were partly responsible for the uprising today. After
assuming power in 2000, Asad promised to implement wide ranging economic reforms that
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would lead to a more open, privatized and market driven economic system. He supported the
privatization of banks and farms, planned to liberalize the banking system, increase capital
investment and trade, and promoted private sector investment instead of the traditional public
sector dominance favored by the socialist Baathist system. These changes built on the very
limited opening his father Hafiz entertained, but ended up going much farther to create a more
liberal, market friendly system. Such a system, cautiously embracing openness, proved
incompatible with the political system and police state that remained reliant on oppression and
authoritarianism. Although Asad and his advisors intended for the reforms to positively affect
Syrian citizens, the opposite effect led to disillusionment. The cronyism and preferential
structures imbedded in Syria’s economic system did not allow for proper implementation of
market reforms and the unbiased distribution of resources (Makovsky 2011). During Asad’s
rule, some aesthetic measures of economic performance looked positive – the growth rate of
the economy rose to 5 percent per year under Asad whereas it had been negative 2.5 percent
in 1999 and zero percent in 2000, the year his father Hafiz died. There was also a boom in land
prices and a stark increase in investment, from 17 percent of GDP in 2000 to 23 percent in
2007. This apparent economic upswing, however, was largely driven by Syrian oil exports,
which increased by 18% under Asad’s rule before dropping dramatically in 2008. Depleted
reserves and lower production led oil exports to drop by 39%, a devastating loss of income for
an economy reliant on oil rents. Moreover, the “positive” indicators during the boom years of
Asad’s rule proved not to reflect the real economy affecting the majority of the Syrian
population. The share of agricultural investment fell from 16% in 2000, to 9% in 2007.
Investment in industry also dwindled. The reversal of these subsidies hit Syria’s poverty stricken
population hard, 56% of who worked in agriculture or construction (BTI 2010, 9-15). The illusion
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of economic growth during Asad’s rule did not create the expected employment opportunities,
nor did it bring the development of diversified sectors within the economy. So by the time oil
revenue ran out, the broad spectrum of the real economy lay in ruins (Matar 2012).
Unemployment rose in 2009 to at least 24.4% as key sectors of the economy, like
manufacturing, contracted. Poverty increased, despite the rise in state revenues. This had the
effect of increasing income inequality as well. Inflation also rose, with nominal wages not
keeping up. From 2006-2008, inflation rose from 10-15%. What’s more, is that Asad’s market
reforms gradually began to phase out the subsidies citizens had depended on for so many
decades. These ill advised reforms failed to transition the system successfully to a liberal
market driven economy, and instead led to a hollow and illusory period of profligacy that was
eventually met with sharp economic downturn (BTI 2010, 3, 9-15).

Government Violence
One of the most marked accelerators early on in the Syrian conflict was the
government’s heavy-handed use of violence against what began as a peaceful protest
movement. Such uncompromising and brutal methods sometimes succeed in suppressing
dissent, but in this case, it elicited violence in return. The use of force by governments is often
hard to measure since the concept of a monopoly of force is a principle pillar that defines state
power. However, it can be qualitatively analyzed within the context of legitimacy, legality and
just war. Such standards are governed by such international standards as the Geneva
conventions, though the enforcement of such laws are often deemed subjectively and
selectively applied. Therefore, the analysis of just or unjust government violence must be
studied under international standards, within the context of domestic norms, and perhaps
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within scenarios of non-governed spaces. Such a complex evaluation of government violence is
critical to understanding the legitimacy of regimes, the motivation behind rebellion and causes
of international intervention.
The state claim of a monopoly of force over the population means that the use of
violence by the state is generally deemed legitimate by the whole of society since the
population consents to certain rules and laws that govern their interaction and are punishable
by governmental use of force. This also extends to punishment and authority to take away
rights if individuals violate the laws of the land (Weber 1919). These social boundaries and
norms can either be codified or not, but generally are understood and respected by all of
society. Such a social contract bases itself solely on the legitimacy of the nation state, which
gives it the power to enforce such an arrangement. Should the nation state violate its end of
the social contract, the contract could be seen as broken, in which case the state’s foundation
of legitimacy may erode. If government violence perceivably is arbitrary, indiscriminate and
unjustified, then the government’s legitimacy wanes and the potential for violent revolt rises.
This effect is subjective and variable but is an important component to the progression of
revolutionary movements. Our definition of revolution includes the use of violence for political
means, and this is because government violence often has a mobilizing effect on cross-sections
of the population that would normally be passive or apathetic. Such heavy-handedness by the
government can energize people toward contentious politics with the goal of checking
government overreach or to remove them from power. In fact, government overreach often
correlates with more determined and pervasive outbreaks of contentious politics. Therefore,
the degree of contentious politics likely directly relates to the degree and severity of a
government’s perceived illegitimate use of force. However, neither force is acting solely upon
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the other, and can instead act to compound the use of government violence and contentious
politics, resulting in revolt, civil war and revolution. It is important to note, however, that
overbearing government violence, as applied in some cases of counterinsurgency warfare, can
actually suppress revolutionary activity and popular mobilization. Is seems, resolute,
overwhelming brute force can crush such movements, whereas the irresolute, hesitant and
uneven use of force is less effective in crushing rebellions. The latter strategy is sometimes
taken by weak leaders who hesitate to take actions that damage their reputation, threaten
their perceived legitimacy from the people or by those leaders self-conscious of international
criticisms of human rights violations (Greene 1999, 141-143) (Tilly 1977).

Elite Fragmentation
Divisions within the ruling polity often reveal early indicators that revolutionary
movements may succeed. Often these divisions accompany military defeat or disputes over the
domestic use of force, economic crises and other strategic policy blunders that cause leadership
rifts among decision makers. During such trying times, the existence of a strong, resolved and
unchallenged leader is important to maintain the unity of the government. Without one, the
ruling regime can succumb to its own devices and weaken. The death of a leader or emergence
of a weaker leader through succession can also allow for greater degrees of elite fragmentation
during crises. Bashar al-Asad appeared to consolidate power in the wake of his father’s 30 year
rule, but the 2011 revolt proved his grip on Syria’s authoritarian system was not as strong has
his father’s (BTI 2012). Zero-sum power struggles are common in non-democratic and
especially authoritarian systems. Asad, however, has maintained a functioning and loyal inner
cadre for the most part. Aside from a few Sunni defectors, the existential threat to the regime
60

has left Asad’s inner circle – who were largely made up of relatives and members of his Alawite
sect minority – desperate to retain power and avoid potential reprisal from the Sunni majority
opposition (BBC 2012). The most notable defection among Asad’s camp is Manaf Tlas, a former
friend of Asad, is a Sunni Muslim who used to be among the minority in the largely Alawite
dominated regime (Haaretz 2012). Although the Alawite-Sunni split has not always proved as
prominent a dividing line in Syrian society, it has become a sad consequence of civil conflict in
divided societies. The sectarian split and the Sunni majority’s affiliation has acted as a loosely
unifying force among the disparate opposition; however, such a common identity has proved
insufficient at creating the strength and unity necessary to overthrow the regime. Conversely,
the Alawite unity within Asad’s regime has acted as a more powerful unifying force since the
minority themselves face dire repercussions should their grip on power give way to an
increasingly violent, vindictive and radical Sunni opposition.

Reform and Political Change
Much like the stress of economic downturn, rapid changes to a political and social
system often create shocks to society that undermine governmental legitimacy and motivate
popular revolt. Such a case is exacerbated when economic reform is not accompanied by social
and political change. In short, if political modernization is denied to a population experiencing
an economic increase in quality of life then that population will often demand more freedom
and less oppression. This is because the advent of economic opportunity and greater wealth
often increase a population’s social consciousness. With greater economic opportunities comes
greater opportunity for education, community participation and public discourse. Therefore,
the neglect of rising social needs can lead to unrest, particularly if the regime chooses instead
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to implement faux political reforms or disingenuous, half-hearted strategies to address greater
social demands. As a society’s economic well-being rises and is accompanied by elevated social
consciousness, the recognition of past inequities and current regime oppression can erode the
legitimacy of their government. Such is the case of the Asad regime.
The Syrian regime has thus endured a harsh period of economic decline, conflict, severe
international pressure and declining legitimacy; all, in part, brought on by a biased uneven
commitment to reforms that have not benefited the majority. The shift to market reforms,
brought about in part by the decline of state-run oil reserves, has failed to generate jobs for the
youth. The market reforms have also empowered the business class and given them increased
influence, but failed to bestow upon them any political power or bring them into governance in
any meaningful way. When the irreversible shift to market reforms began under Asad’s regime,
he flirted with political liberalization, giving his citizens a taste of the political reforms that
should have accompanied his economic overhaul. However, Asad and his inner circle refused to
jeopardize the stability of the system by which they dominated absolutely. Therefore, the taste
of political reform was just a tease; and his failure to follow through left the majority of Syrians
with a bad taste in their mouths. As the effects of economic liberalization benefited some
sectors of Syria’s elite, inequality increased, as did the corruption. This weakened the regime’s
traditional support base and led to increased calls for accountability. All these unmet
expectations, unfulfilled promises and institutionalized bias culminated in the transition to
unrest and eventually violence in 2011 (BTI 2012, 2-4).
As Tocqueville wrote when recording events of the French Revolution, “the regime that
is destroyed by a revolution is almost always better than the one preceding it, and experience
teaches us that usually the most dangerous time for a bad government is when it attempts to
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reform itself (1856, 214).” Even during the 19th century, before the modern understanding of
the revolution phenomenon itself, Tocqueville understood that bad regimes are more likely to
succumb to revolts. This is particularly true when overall quality of life is improved, after
systemic shocks perceivably threaten the livelihood of the masses or provide the opportunity
for average citizens to demand more and better reforms. His assertion aptly describes Syria in
two parts. First, is the hope by citizens that what replaces bad regimes will be better. This is
important because revolutions exact a heavy cost on society. The necessary critical mass of
challengers must envision hope for success and a better future if they are to succumb to the
violence, instability, economic hardship and overall risk that comes from attempting to topple
the existing regime. The second part of Toqueville’s quote is equally true – challengers are
more likely to emerge during periods of reform because this provides an impetus or
opportunity for challengers to mobilize. Adopting reforms exposes the regime to vulnerability
because it essentially acknowledges the structural weakness of the status quo system. Such
reform campaigns also come with a transition period, whereby the system itself is partially influx and vulnerable. Finally, such reforms often are undertaken with an expectation of hope and
positive change, which if left unmet and unfulfilled, can lead to greater societal outrage than if
the previous status quo remain unchanged. Therefore, such crises of reform, often lead the
people into conflict with their government. As we’ve seen in Syria, the failure of reforms to
benefit the majority, and instead empower the regime minority, accelerated the slide to revolt.
The biased, sectarian and authoritarian system created under Asad’s father, Hafiz, created a
system structurally beneficial to a minority of regime members, at the expense of the majority.
Such preconditions left Syria structurally and systemically unsound by the time Asad took over,
and the period of uneven reforms left his regime weakened and vulnerable (Matar 2012).
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People inherently strive toward progress and modernization, and are extremely resistant to the
threat of reversals along this trajectory; such a situation provided strong incentive for Syria’s
revolutionary movement (Greene 1999, 145-147).

Demonstration Effect
As Samuel Huntington has noted in The Third Wave (1992), the snowballing or
demonstration effect can be very powerful in mobilizing like-minded individuals toward
movements of collective action. This term of “snowballing” aptly applies to the study of
revolutions. In economics, the demonstration theory shows how consumers change their
purchasing habits based on the consumption patters of their neighbors and based on the desire
to achieve higher living standards. Such behavior and motivations are similarly applicable to our
understanding of what drives revolutionary movements. Most often, a population is motivated
by the desire to protect their livelihood or back a group that promises change for the better.
This final accelerator is also likely one of the most important for explaining not just the
revolutionary mobilization inside Syria, but the greater Arab Spring phenomenon. This is
important because the demonstration effect similarly describes other social science
phenomena such as “diffusion,” “contagion” and the “domino effect.” Each of these concepts
describes how social phenomena do not necessarily act only inside a vacuum of one country or
one societies domestic politics (Hayes 2011). Often, sweeping social trends affect change in the
social consciousness of neighboring nations and inspire similar movements among them. Such
has clearly proved true with the Arab Spring phenomenon (The Guardian 2012).
The interplay of ideas was enhanced during the Arab Spring by the pervasive use of
social media. This is the first time Arabs across the Middle East were able to share ideas, social
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mobilization techniques and popular support, all in real time. Twitter especially played a vital
role in mobilizing Syria’s opposition by networking through the Internet and emotionally
energizing supporters by publishing regime atrocities. Social media has become a vital
repertoire for today’s revolutionary movements (MediaMeasurment.com 2012).
#SyrianRevolution has 183 thousand tweets, 23.4 thousand photos and videos posted, and 144
thousand followers. In the Internet realm of social mobilization, Twitter can function in a
centralized networking role and a clearinghouse for revolutionary propaganda. Facebook too,
serves a similar role. The Syrian Revolution Facebook page serves a similar function, and its
propaganda messaging has created a rallying effect for those on the ground supporting the
movement (Facebook). The social media presence of these groups writ-large also creates
international awareness by politically active cross-sections of the international community.
Such support also can spur action by international governments and organizations by
compelling them to respond to the situation. This latter point speaks to the immense power
social media has to create the type of demonstration and domino effect we’ve seen at play in
the Arab Spring nations. The wide viewership of social media activity, it’s real time capabilities
and popularity among young people, has made it a potent tool in the repertoire of
revolutionary mobilizers.
Throughout history, evidence of the demonstration effect is confirmed by periods of
common social change that go beyond random correlation and in fact reveal a noteworthy
degree of causation. The American Revolution is often cited as contributing to the French
Revolution, which in turn inspired revolutionary mobilization in a number of European
countries (Tilly 1977) (Skocpol 1979). France was again an inspiration to liberal revolutionary
movements in the 1850s after its 1848 revolution. Liberal revolts against, monarchs or other
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authoritarians are not the only type of movements susceptible to the demonstration effect.
Nationalist movements of the early 20th century began in Japan and swept numerous other
countries including Iran, Turkey and China. The Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 represented an
ideological movement that also gained momentum through the demonstration effect, and
inspired similar movements across Europe. Anti-colonial movements also gained significant
momentum in the wake of WWII as colonial states from Africa, to the Mideast and Asia rose up
against imperial powers in the hope of independence. Analogous types of revolutionary
movements, therefore, appear to be subject to social trends, which transcend borders; and
there is no better recent example then that of the Arab Spring. Many could argue the repertoire
behind the Arab Spring began instead with Persians, during Iran’s Green Movement in 2009; or
were similarly inspired by the Color Revolutions of Former Soviet States during the early 2000s.
Whether connected or not through some collective social consciousness, the post-2011 Arab
Spring movements are undeniably related. They all have common motivations, desires and a
repertoire of actions that diffused across the region as a contagion; and of course, Tunisia and
Egypt were the first two dominoes to fall. Of these movements, all sought more freedom, more
political representation and reform of their governments deemed overly oppressive or
authoritarian. Most Arab Spring movements adopted mass protest as their repertoire of choice
but some resorted to violence when the conditions presented themselves. As an accelerator,
the demonstration effect proves important for understanding not just singular cases of
revolution, but how such trends are interconnected across societies. Events in another country,
therefore, can have a notable affect at sparking or accelerating the revolutionary potential of
neighboring states. The potency of this effect is also increased based on the effectiveness of
communication networks, the apparent success of neighboring revolts, the cross-national
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relevancy of repertoires and ideological foundations for the movements and finally the crossnational comparability of the preconditions for each state (Greene 1999, 149).

The J-Curve and Syria’s Breaking Point
The importance of accelerators is perhaps most notably synthesized into the J-Curve
theory developed by James Davies in his 1962 work Toward a Theory of Revolution. In it, Davies
seeks a holistic theory of why populations revolt, and it comes close to identifying singular
causal factors to determine the causation behind outbreaks of revolutionary collective action.
As we have seen, structural preconditions created a situation in Syria with a high degree of
unrest and revolutionary potential. Such conditions can sometimes compound and create a
sense of relative deprivation, where a gap in expectations fuels unrest. In his work Davies
describes the J-curve as a conceptual device to help identify the cause of revolutions.
According to Davies “revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of objective
economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal (Davies 1962,
3).” The sociological phenomenon Davies describes all hinges on the concepts of selfdetermination and relative deprivation. Collectively, both sociological conditions are allowed to
act as a revolutionary accelerator inside societies with ripe revolutionary preconditions. Selfdetermination within a society drives people collectively toward progress and a better quality
of life, measured by economic growth, social freedoms and perceptions of equality. Relative
deprivation occurs when those things are threatened or a large cross-section of society believes
the government cannot meet their expectations. According to Davies when “people then
subjectively feel that ground gained with great effort will be lost; their mood becomes
revolutionary (1962, 1).” Therefore, when a significant period of progress meets a sharp
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reversal of fortunes, this creates an unbearable gap between society’s expectations and the
perceived quality of life, hence increasing the motivation to revolt. Also imperative to Davies
concept of the J-curve is a population’s perceived ability to affect its plight. Social liberalization
and a relaxation of oppression often provide an opening to empower a population to adopt
collective action, particularly in repressive societies. This sociological phenomenon, whereby
people acquire the hope to implement radical change is necessary to the development of a
society’s revolutionary potential. Davies also correctly asserts that such a condition is not
inevitable, this revolutionary potential can be dissipated if the governing regime takes strategic
and calculated action to assuage or oppress such forces, or they can just as easily naturally fade
away (1962). In Syria, this is clearly not the case. The fear of the regime was quickly overcome
and the regime became the primary obstacle to the society’s perceived self-determination and
its rising expectations.
In many ways, the J-Curve theory addresses a primary accelerator responsible for
revolutionary movements, but it also conceptualizes the result of dormant preconditions that
had created the conditions for the environment to be vulnerable to revolution. Accelerators
simply create the chain reaction of stored energy that exist as preconditions. In Syria’s case,
social, economic and social change created the expectations that acted as preconditions;
whereas, the unmet expectations and reversal of fortunes acted as the accelerator. For
example, Syria’s pre-revolutionary state revealed a notable degree of social and economic
liberalization that proved poorly managed by Bashar al-Asad implemented. Such policies of
relaxed authoritarianism, mixed with capitalist and social reforms are similar to the decade
preceding the 1979 Islamic Revolution and the ousting of the Shah. Comparing both cases gives
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a better understanding how the right combination of preconditions and accelerators can
combine to ignite the spark, which causes revolutionary mobilization.

Iran’s Preconditions and Accelerators - Parallels to Syria
Oil revenues in Iran during the late 1960s and 70s soared, which led to a great economic
expansion. This unprecedented economic advancement superficially cast Iran as a modernizing
example for the region and shining beacon of the developing world. However, beneath the
surface, its society experienced a “crisis of wealth” that created high expectations for Iranians,
where political reforms were not keeping pace with their advancing economic achievements
and rising social consciousness. In fact, the Shah’s attempt to keep political representation
suppressed generated extreme resentment among a population whose social consciousness
had dramatically risen in a short period. These conditions created a yearning for more progress,
and higher expectations for political reforms (Milani 59-72).
By 1973, the Arab-Israeli war led many Arab states to use oil as a weapon by putting an
embargo on the United States and other nations who backed Israel. Such policies led oil prices
to rise dramatically. Though Iran’s Shah was a staunch U.S. ally and did not support the
embargo, he became a major benefactor nonetheless. Empowered by windfall profits, the Shah
began an unprecedented campaign of state building and sought to build Iran as an economic
and military regional power. The Shah ordered an ambitious “five year development plan” from
1973-1978 that was actually revised to become even more ambitious given the unexpected
influx of wealth. The Shah reinvested much of the funds into the public sector and undertook
expansive infrastructure projects and some private sector ventures. During the initial ballooning
of the economy, demand for labor skyrocketed and unemployment virtually disappeared. The
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period of economic progress expanded and empowered the middle class, especially the urban
landed class, of which many would turn against the state in 1978. The Shah also purchased the
most sophisticated weapons the U.S. would sell, short of nuclear bombs. It quickly became
America’s number one purchaser of military equipment and had the world’s seventh largest
military budget overall. The profligacy of the state spurred dramatic progress, but was also a
source of resentment from the populace. The growing dependence on the U.S. became a
rallying point for the Shah’s opponents who considered his drive to become a superpower as an
unnecessary waste of Iran’s resources and confirmation that the state had become a proxy of
the U.S. The distribution or wealth was also uneven and increased the country’s socioeconomic inequality. The state became prey to corruption, nepotism and favoritism, which
became endemic in all levels of society and government. The accelerated growth, in short,
outpaced Iran’s capacity to absorb such economic and social prosperity, and did so in a biased
way that left many average citizens resentful of the consolidation of wealth among the elite.
Although the Shah, and the world, viewed the nation’s newfound wealth as a marked
progression, he was aware that some have-nots were becoming alienated and dangerous
(Milani 93-95).
To address this “crisis of wealth”, the Shah wavered between populist reforms and more
state oppression. He haphazardly sought to set a minimum wage and control inflation, moves
which turned the industrial class against him. A war on price gougers also set the merchant
class against him. By 1977, Iran’s economic fortunes reversed and energy shortages were
causing extended blackouts in the country’s capital. In the year preceding the Islamic
revolution, inflation peaked, deficits rose, and the government’s populist reforms proved
inefficient, particularly new state policies to distribute oil wealth. The state’s oil exports and
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revenues also sharply declined. The period of profligacy gave way to a sharp economic and
social decline, which created textbook conditions for Davie’s J-Curve (Milani 92-101).
Events in Syria since Bashar al-Asad’s ascension to power in 2000 reveal striking parallels
to Iran during the 1970s in that a period of prosperity eventually proved unsustainable and
drew ire from the public who became frustrated by empty promises. In the latter half of the
first decade in the 21stcentury, the Syrian regime weathered ongoing destabilizing pressures.
Unlike the case of Iran and the Shah, however, U.S. relations were poor and Syria suffered
debilitating U.S. led sanctions. The country was also challenged by a rapid decline in the staterun economy and oil revenues, which led to high unemployment, especially among the youths.
The making of such conditions were in large part due to the social and economic
“transformation” undertaken by Bashar after taking over for his father. In short, a number of
accelerators were present during the transition to conflict in 2011, including: partial military
defeat, economic crises, government violence, reform and political change, the demonstration
effect, and the J-Curve.
By forcing uneven market reforms, implementing economic liberalization policies, but
neglecting political and social change, the majority of Syrian’s did not experience the benefits of
the economic system’s transformation. This created expectations that went unmet, and created
an opening where the people felt compelled to demand more. Unlike Iran, the first decade of
the 21st century was by no means an economic boom for Syria. However, capitalist reforms and
the partial liberalization of some social and political issues created an environment vulnerable
to revolution. As we have seen, when a prolonged period of rising expectations follows a short
period of sharp reversal, revolutionary potential is increased; and the larger the gap between
expectations and gratification the higher the revolutionary potential. In Syria, the inequities
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were great, the motivation for change was high and the Arab Spring was the trigger event to
light the powder keg.
These accelerators all represent variables that greatly exacerbated revolutionary
potential of Syria’s challengers. Such accelerators helped push Syria’s revolutionary movement
toward a rejection of the government and a mobilization toward violence. However, one
accelerator, elite fragmentation, has not been sufficiently activated. This unmet condition is an
integral source of strength for the ruling polity since the integrity of the regime remains intact.
Therefore, the absence of significant elite fragmentation has allowed the Asad regime to
weather the rise of such overwhelming opposition and challenging environmental conditions.
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Chapter Five: Elements of a Successful Revolutionary Movement
Thomas Greene’s comparative analysis of revolutionary movements does a good job of
capturing the complex models and common characteristics that help synthesize theories of
revolutions (1999). When viewing revolutions as a linear process, as Brinton would have us do,
it’s important to understand what conditions and events cause each subsequent domino to fall.
Brinton, Greene and Tilly all agree that revolutions aren’t just a social phenomenon that comes
like a natural disaster; they have to be made through a socially conscious, interactive
competition among forces of humanity. And unlike phenomena of the natural sciences, human
cognizance allows for variables to be anticipated and acted upon, thus making their outcomes
even more unpredictable. Nevertheless, certain predictable characteristics are common to
successful revolutions. For example, Tilly has correctly identified the mobilization of resources
as integral to making revolutions, and the components of that success will be addressed in this
section (1977).
Preconditions create the structural weaknesses in any societal system, while
accelerators fan the flames of collective action. But collective action has many forms, and the
characteristics the movement assumes will determine to what degree the movement impacts
society. This is particularly important if the movement’s goal is a destruction of the old regime
and its replacement with a new revolutionary government. In the modern case of Syria, mass
mobilization evolved to violent opposition and eventually large-scale civil conflict. This section
will address why such a transition occurred and what form it took. Most popular movements
73

remain peaceful or lose momentum, regardless of their impact on society. Therefore,
identifying the characteristics of revolutionary movements will be important to understanding
the nature of Syria’s movement, and its prospects for success. The classical model of
revolutionary mobilization previously dominate in academia asserted that such movements
were most effective when one or more leaders organize, motivate and unify the efforts of the
opposition toward revolutionary action. Although this previous point proved part of
conventional wisdom, events such as the Arab Spring have caused us to challenge such
assumptions. Recent new social movements, particularly Syria’s sister movements from the
Arab Spring, have challenged the necessity of centralized, hierarchical leadership. Movements
in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria and even Iran, emerged organically,
with no hierarchical leadership. The movements were decentralized and organized through
new technology such as social networks. In fact, their strength lay with their ability to popularly
mobilize mass movements through the Internet, thereby posing less risk to individual leaders
and creating greater strength in numbers (The Guardian 2012). Such new social movements
even gained traction in the West, where the Occupy Wall Street Movement grew popular
support across the U.S., captured headlines and drove the public debate on socio-economic
issues in America. The emergence of new social movements empowered by social media is a
prime area for further research and their potential for social change may only increase.
Manuel Castell’s aforementioned work is one of the first to contribute significantly to
the study of these new emerging social movements since he details in depth how they are
being empowered by new technology and online tools like social networks. His work focused in
part on the Arab Spring, of which the inspiration, diffusion of ideas and repertoire were
essential to the emergence of Syria’s own movement (2012). Such new social movements have
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in fact touched nearly every Arab nation, and even other Middle Eastern nations like Turkey
and Iran and their impact on the public debate over ideas has been transformative. In fact, their
impact on revolutionary movements may have even caused the traditional model of successful
revolutionary movements to evolve. Whereas strong charismatic leadership previously served
as a primary motivating and unifying factor of successful revolutions, this center of gravity can
effectively be substituted by new technology and mass, horizontal involvement. New
technology has proved capable of stimulating mass mobilization, promoting an ideological
narrative, and creating the type of unity of effort necessary to pressure regimes like Egypt,
Tunisia and Yemen to undergo revolutionary transition.
Tunisia’s deposal of Ben Ali was accomplished with by an organic, decentralized, popular
mobilization. It played an important role as the first and one of the least violent of all the Arab
Spring social movements. Its success proved a harbinger for future movements. Egypt was the
second Arab Spring domino to fall and it was also among the most romanticized and celebrated
of the Arab Spring revolutions. Egypt demonstrated the power of new social movements and
the technology used to mobilize the masses and of international pressure. Twitter was an
essential tool of oppositionists to rally support and share information on the opposition and
regime oppression. Facebook helped created the social communities for opposition, while
facilitating the communication among oppositionists and the world. YouTube became the
premier video sharing website where regime atrocities and heavy handed violence was
revealed in real time, for the whole world to witness. These and other new technologies were
also accessible to a large population, even those with only limited access to technology
(Guardian 2012) (CIA Factbook). The combination of new technologies as an emerging
repertoire of social movements should be integral to future research on revolutions. The
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evolution of revolutions is likely to continue to trend toward the path of new social movements,
seeing as the decentralized, flat model of organization has greater staying power compared to
revolutionary movements that depend on single points of leadership. In such latter movements
in modern society, targeting and removing such leaders is accomplished with ease by regimes
with state resources and power at their disposal. This emerging model is not foolproof,
however, considering not all of the Arab Spring social movements led to revolutionary change.
In Bahrain, the Monarchy retains power. The Gulf States remain relatively stable, despite
contending with their own residual Arab Spring movements. Libya’s authoritarian government
fell, but foreign military intervention by the West played an integral role in degrading
Muammar Gaddafi’s military regime. However, the importance of leadership has not been
overshadowed completely (Ghali 2012).
As seen with the rise of ISIL, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, strong leadership can serve as
a potent force to mobilize radical revolutionary movements. Al-Baghdadi emerged from the
Iraq insurgency as a charismatic extremist leader in the model of Max Weber’s “charismatic
authority (1919).” As his movement grew, it gained military power, funding and followers.
Eventually Baghdadi’s movement evolved to build itself administratively, creating institutions of
government, and eventually claiming statehood. Under this renewed Islamic Caliphate alBaghdadi has claimed additional legal power as the chief religious authority and senior
statesmen. ISIL’s successful territorial conquest and establishment of governance over
previously un-governed space has allowed Baghdadi to claim such a revolutionary
transformation toward a new state (Caerus 2014). Baghdadi has also successfully staked claims
over traditional centers of authority in the region, such as tribes and local power bases. By
claiming legal and traditional authority over his new caliphate, Baghdadi has transformed his
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charismatic authority into a position as the head of a new government (1919). With this new,
more powerful claim, Baghdadi hopes to trump the previously existing state authority and
traditional authority of tribes (Caris 2014) (al-Hayat 2). Leadership and other characteristics of
successful social movements will be expounded upon in this section.

Leadership Lacking Among Moderates, Strong with the Radicals
As discussed previously, revolutionary leadership in the context of new social
movements is no longer viewed as essential to mass mobilization. The advent of real-time, new
technologies and social media has allowed for decentralized mass movements to succeed with
or without charismatic leadership. Historically, it was extremely difficult for the great masses to
liberate themselves, without having a little help from charismatic men of action. And despite
the emergence of new social movements, the role that leadership has played is still worth
consideration and study.
Revolutionary leaders are most successful when they can speak the language of the
masses, but also understand how to attack the ruling regime, before ultimately governing
themselves. The ideology and system of governments adopted by revolutionary leaders has
varied, but in the end, some form of leadership must emerge from revolutionary movements.
These leaders, regardless of their background, become the new elites within the next ruling
polity. This is the great irony and challenge of revolutionary leaders.
Leaders within revolutionary movements vary significantly; often they fall along the
“left-right” political spectrum. “Leftist” leaders tend to promote principles of equality,
egalitarianism and social justice, while leaders on the “right” emphasize strength, order, and a
resurgence of nationalist power. Within this spectrum, some types of leaders are more likely to
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emerge than others, particularly when the environmental conditions for societal instability
favor one trend or the other. The potential leadership of the FSA and other Syrian
revolutionaries does not fit the typical “right-left” model, nor have they successfully created a
highly centralized or hierarchical mode of organization. This fact itself likely partially explains
their relative lack of strategy and success. In attempting to develop the centralized mode of
leadership, they have failed; moreover, they have failed to improve upon the natural and
inherent form of collective leadership that emerged among the incipient opposition movement.
Essentially, Syria’s disparate leaders tried to create a movement of centralized authority, a
strategy which was doomed to fail, when they might have had more success pursuing a more
decentralized and collective approach to administration. As we will see, if revolutionary
leadership or an effective model of organization does not emerge in Syria, the wider Opposition
is likely to continue foundering. Conversely, a single strong member of the Opposition, such as
ISIL, could emerge as most powerful.
If ISIL does, gain staying power, such a movement will likely resemble rightist qualities
due to its authoritarian leadership style and strong ideological inclinations to religious
extremism. This is partially due to the societal instability and violence brought by Syria’s
revolutionary movement, which has left much of the country vulnerable to radicalism and
violence. It is also attributable to the sectarian and exclusive nature of the state’s dynamics,
and the relative success of radical groups like ISIL that are imposing a form of fundamentalist
theocratic rule based on medieval caliphates. Compared to past revolutions, leadership on the
right sometimes comes from less privileged backgrounds, as in the case of Nazi Germany and
Fascist Italy. Hitler and Mussolini both came from modest backgrounds of working class
parents. Revolutionary leaders on the right define their struggle in terms of social order and
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often emphasize strong authority over promises of equality. This authority can be drawn from
strength, order, or even fundamentalist religious beliefs, as was the case in Iran, and with ISIL,
albeit in a very different manifestation. They also can draw their authority from conservative
political ideologies and often-extremist nationalist beliefs, again, as in the case of Nazi Germany
or the Italian Fascists (Greene 1999, 45-46). Although rightist revolutionaries are less inclined to
caste themselves as the saviors of the lower classes, the way many leftist leaders do, their
modest backgrounds appeal to both sections of society, even political and military elites.
Unlike ISIL, the moderate leaders have failed to sufficiently emerge in Syria, despite the
West and Arab State backers’ attempts to encourage or finance them (Dickinson 2013). As a
result, the most radical, violent and fundamentalist challenger has moved to the forefront.
ISIL’s strength is partially attributed to its brutality and strong leadership, yet its success can
also be partially attributable to a failure by the wider Opposition to unify.
Within revolutionary leadership, the role of intellectuals is also important. They
“manipulate the symbolic rather than the material environment (Greene 1999, 46).” Which
means they shape the ideas that are so important for revolutions. As we will explore in later
sections, ideas become the hope for a better life and create a focused vision of the future.
Charismatic leadership has traditionally served as the source of this abstract element, since the
masses typically lack the motivation for revolutionary mobilization (Greene 1999, 46). However,
with the emergence of new social movements, connected by technology and social media, such
ideologies can thrive and proliferate organically (Castells 2012). Nevertheless, the role of
intellectuals remains important since revolutions are not just about war and palace intrigue;
they must drive the ideological narrative of the revolution in order to establish a new social
order that must be debated and determined through the implementation of ideas.
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The role of students is also important. It is rare that students solely lead revolutionary
movements, but their organizations and universities often serve as hotbeds for revolutionary
activity. Students, being intellectuals in training, are highly motivated to join the debate over
ideas and use those ideas to shape the world (Greene 1999, 46). They are often essential
participants to any revolutionary movement because they are society’s natural opposition,
always inclined to challenge authority and, especially recently, empowered to do so. Students
often serve as foot soldiers for revolutions, demonstrating and mobilizing for their cause. Early
on in Syria, students and universities were a hotbed of political opposition, following their
brethren across the region. As the conflict has evolved into a civil war, the role of intellectuals
and students has diminished somewhat, which is a partial reason for the fragmentation of the
movement and failure to create a unity of effort among revolutionary groups (Fearon 2013).
Mobilization and coordinating cross-cutting alliances is a skill that requires a high degree
of charisma, intelligence and even great fortune, which makes the emergence of such
individuals extremely rare. Successful revolutionary leaders exercise charismatic authority by
simplifying complexities for the average citizen, using persuasive arguments in the war of ideas,
and providing decisive action. Essentially a leader serves to proselytize and convert his
followers to ensure they radicalize to the point of taking great risk in supporting revolutionary
action. Although new social movements have shown that decentralized movements can topple
the existing regime, it still remains important for emergent revolutionary leadership to become
skilled managers and administrators. For the revolutionary process to establish a revolutionary
regime, above all, requires a bureaucratization of the new order if it is to consolidate and not
succumb to counterrevolution (Greene 1999, 52-55).
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The evolution of new social movements is an important new component to revolutions,
and their power for social change may only increase (Castells 2012). Yet the power of new
social movements is likely to negatively correlate with regime strength and legitimacy. The new
social movement in Tunisia was likely most successful because the regime of Ben Ali was weak
and he chose to resign. Mubarak in Egypt was also weak, from old age and ill health; conditions
that likely led to early success by Egypt’s new social movement (The Guardian 2012). The ability
to mass mobilize against ruling regimes has become empowered by new technology, but their
success will still be partially dependent on regime durability.

Followers Must Become Challengers
Charles Tilly describes challengers as contenders for power that act without access to
the ruling polity. They consequently have fewer resources initially, compared to members, who
typically have more connections to the ruling polity. In order to succeed in their revolutionary
aspirations, these challengers must acquire more resources and must act under conditions of
opportunity and threat (Tilly 1977, 3-4). Although leadership is of vital importance to
revolutionary mobilization, there would be no leaders if not for followers. And it’s up to the
leaders and their cadre of followers to create a movement of challengers capable of
transferring power and resources (Tilly 1977, 1, 7-14). Among followers there is also great
variance with regard to degrees of activism. Often apathetic, passive individuals are more
numerous than the politically conscious and activist cross-section of intellectuals, students and
disaffected groups that make up the foot soldiers of the movement. These foot soldiers are the
great mobilizers of revolutionary movements. They do not make up the strategic leadership,
but are the ideologues that organize the masses at the grass roots level. They are motivated by
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the ideas of a better world, but at the same time require reasonable expectations that their
general security and material well-being will increase. Therefore, the recurring cost-benefit
analysis by followers is often the difference between action and inaction, so it is extremely
important for the movement to develop cohesiveness, organization and continual direction.
Without this, a revolutionary movement loses momentum and fizzles out (Greene 1999, 64-65).
Regardless of right-left or hybrid models of revolutionary movements, the coalescing of
cross-cutting alliances is necessary for any revolutionary movement’s success. This is because
these movements need to create a strong enough coalition to challenge the existing
government, but also become resilient enough so that they cannot be destroyed. Furthermore,
Tilly correctly asserts the importance of creating a coalition is primarily because it allows the
revolutionary movement to maximize its influence, pool resources and make claim on the
existing government (Tilly 1977, 7-38). Cross-cutting alliances, therefore, are what differentiate
revolts and rebellions from revolutions. Simple peasant rebellions, workers revolts, union
strikes etc., only affect a small minority and usually fail to gain the critical mass of supporters
necessary to build the momentum that can bring down entire state systems. To accomplish
revolutionary change, whole cross sections of society must be involved in the effort. Especially
in rightist revolutionary movements, nationalism and sometimes racism are important
mobilizing ideologies. This correlates to the case of Syria as the majority Sunni sect is loosely
unified against the Allawite ruling class. This loose sectarian affiliation has played a central
unifying role for the opposition; however, has yet to prove the unifying force necessary to
consolidate the cross-cutting alliances necessary for revolution.
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The Necessity of Cross-Cutting Alliances
Cross-cutting alliances are especially important for the success of revolutionary
movements because they transform incipient rebellions into movements by an larger and
empowered group of activists. The latter phenomenon can give rise to a critical mass of
followers, turned challengers that is much more capable of transforming the structure of power
in societies. Of course, determining what this critical mass constitutes can be tricky. It does not
necessarily need to be a certain percentage of the population, an outright majority, plurality or
even an exact cross-section of demographics. Nevertheless, a critical mass of revolutionaries is
not possible without alliances and unity of effort. Such a level of support gives the challengers
the ability to mobilize sufficient resources and deny the legitimacy of the government they seek
to control. In the end, this critical mass can theoretically succeed at removing the existing polity
and replacing it with a new form of governance in a model of their choosing. Reaching such
critical mass depends on multiple factors. The first is whether the cross-cutting alliances can
recruit what are considered dominant classes of society with the ability to influence the greater
system. The strength of the system itself is also a determining factor. If the regime lacks
legitimacy among the greater population, as many colonial societies have, then they are weaker
and it is easier for the opposition to reach critical mass. Finally, the actual numbers of
revolutionaries are perceivably very small. Often it is only thousands or tens of thousands of
people needed to secure revolution in countries of millions. That is because they constitute a
critical mass of active participants able to overpower the ruling polity, while the silent majority
either stands on the sideline or offers passive support. Especially in countries where legitimacy
is weak, a small coalition is capable of big things. Such a critical mass can still be reached if the
active minority of one social class allies with the active minority of others. Should these cross83

cutting alliances employ effective tactics and communicate an appealing revolutionary
ideology, their prospects for success increase, especially as the strength of the existing
government decreases (Greene 1999, 73-76).
The threshold for cross-cutting alliances has not been met by Syria’s opposition –
specifically the Syrian National Council (SNC) - and is unlikely to coalesce among the Western
backed “moderate oppositions.” Nevertheless, the United States and worldwide coalitions
recently renewed a pledge of support for moderate opposition groups. Given the sheer
numbers of disparate groups, however, it is unclear if this support will have a sufficient impact
to compel unity of effort and tip the balance in the Opposition’s favor (PILPG 2012, 1-4) (USIP
The Day After Project 2014) (Obama 2014).” While multiple anti-Asad groups continue to exist,
it is unlikely they will work cooperatively. It is more likely they will instead remain partially in
competition with one another, thus undermining their ability to unify and focus on the Asad
regime. The same is true of these rebel grouping’s patrons. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait the
U.A.E, Turkey and other regional nations all have different visions for the opposition and
support different factions. This has only served to exacerbate the factionalism and disunity
amongst the opposition, while further empowering Asad and the radicals such as ISIL (O’Bagy
2013, b, 13).

Ideology - The Ideas that Bind, Motivate and Justify Revolutions
The concept of ideas was broached in previous sections, but a closer examination of
ideology as an essential element of revolutions is warranted because ideas confer legitimacy to
revolutionary leadership and serve as the foundation for cross-cutting alliances. A strong
revolutionary ideology helps facilitate the coalescing of cross cutting-alliances by promoting a
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vision of a better future and the motivation for action toward that goal. Class conflict,
nationalism, equality, egalitarianism, anti-colonialism, religion, and other deeply emotional
ideas have served revolutionary ideologies well in the past. In Syria’s case, this unifying ideology
has been elusive. The West, through its moral and reticent engagement, has encouraged the
moderate opposition to adopt democracy and liberalism as a unifying ideology (SNC 2012, b)
(Obama 2014). In fact, these principles did organically emerge from many Arab Spring
“revolutions” and are presently heralded by many opposition groups (SNC 2012, b). However,
opposition to Asad is really the only truly unifying theme; thus, Islamists, secularists,
moderates, ethnic Kurds and others remain disparate and weakened by their diverse ideological
visions. Themes and symbols are integral to the development of such a unifying ideology and
often these are defined as catchall, ambiguous terms instead any sort of coherent belief
system. A promise of a better world is no guarantee that a new system of complex governance,
bureaucracy, economic rules and military tradition will emerge overnight. Rather the opposite
is usually true and an organization’s strength is necessary for a revolution to cement itself.
While the importance of developing a unifying ideology is key, the converse is also true,
however, since the lack of a coherent ideology or competing ideologies can undermine the
unity of effort needed in an opposition movement, which is usually grounded in cross-cutting
alliances (Greene 1999, 80-82).
Ideological justifications for the opposition are so important because they symbolically
attack the legitimacy of the regime. An ideology provides a rough blueprint, no matter how
abstract, to break from the weak or failing system of government. Moreover, it undermines the
current conventional norms, by attacking them as unjust, unfair and unacceptable. Using these
ideological justifications are often essential because they also vindicate the use of systematic
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violence, which is a typical technique of successful revolutions. Ideas symbolically attack the
legitimacy of the regime and provide the justification that power should be transferred from
one polity to another (Greene 1999, 80-82).
Among Syria’s opposition, the SNC officially casts itself as a revolutionary movement
seeking the overthrow of Asad and a transition to free and democratic rule (SNC 2012, b). This
ideological statement is carefully crafted for both internal and external consumption in order to
gain supporters at home and abroad. Internally, the opposition is divided on what type of
system will replace Asad and who takes power; however, many of these same leaders also
recognize the importance of presenting a moderate, unified front in order to maintain external
assistance to their movement, not just from the West but also from its Arab patrons. The
opposition is heavily dependent on funding, weaponry and support from outside sources and
promote an ideology and goal palatable to those backers. So far, the Opposition is succeeding
in the goal of maintaining its foreign backers, but has proven less successful in gaining direct
intervention by more powerful Western states, even in the aftermath of the 2013 chemical
weapon attacks by the regime (Farley 2013). Their failure to gain significant Western backing,
and military intervention to bring down the regime, is more about overriding geo-political
concerns than ideological justifications (Farley 2013). Nevertheless, the opposition is having
difficulty casting itself as a democratic movement palatable to the West because hardline and
Islamist elements that make up a large part of the Opposition’s fighting force (Cunningham
2013). The SNC espouses adherence to human rights and the rules of warfare under the Geneva
Conventions but then has its image tarnished by instances of opposition atrocities (SNC 2012, b)
(HRW 2013). The existences of radical elements within its ranks, and documented human rights
offenses have severely undermined their public relations image and consequently some
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international support. For their Arab Sunni backers, who simply want to see Asad gone, radical,
terrorists and Islamists are seen as a lesser evil. But in the eyes of the West, finding a reliable
partner to back is difficult and the alternative potential for the emergence of a radical
revolutionary regime is even less preferable than the existing status quo. Therefore, the battle
over the internal ideology of the opposition will continue to be a limiting factor that
undermines the movement’s prospects for success. One major shortcoming of new social
movements is their lack of unifying ideology. The initial mass mobilization was fed by outrage
against the regime and manifested as a new social movement within the medium of new
technology; however, as the crisis in Syria evolves, the lack of collective leadership, crosscutting alliances and unifying ideology continues to hamper the movement’s power to compel
regime change. Such a unifying ideology would partially help reverse this trend. Thus far,
democracy and liberalism has failed to sufficiently take root, and on the other hand, violent
Islamic fundamentalism has proved divisive yet powerful. Given the sharply drawn ideological
lines and the rough parity among competing groups, it seems unlikely any group can gain total
control, or otherwise adopt such a unifying ideology.
Conversely, the role of ideology likely remains strong within the regime. The governing
Baathist ideology of the Syrian state is based on the principles of, Arab Nationalism, PanArabism and Socialism (CIA Factbook). Although much of these principles have become hollow,
the shell of the Baathist ideology remains a strong unifying force for those members who have
spent their lives devoted to those ideas. More tangibly, the structure of the Baathist governing
system has created institutions by which members lives and livelihood depend on the survival
of the system. The Baathist ideology itself may have declining legitimacy, but it provides a
stronger unifying force than anything the Opposition has proven able to develop.
87

Organization and Structure
Organization and structure are typically aspects of revolutionary movements that lag
behind the initial outbreak of mass-mobilizations. Sometimes the initial mobilization can be
brought on by a trigger event or relatively spontaneous spark to begin the revolutionary
process. Mass mobilization often occurs as society becomes outraged at a particularly grievous
offense by the regime or the boiling over of accumulated grievances. Traditionally, the
spontaneous and mass collective action of disparate groups must eventually be focused with
organizational cohesion if it is to cause real change (Greene 1999, 92). This is changing with the
emergence of new social movements and the empowerment brought to bear under the
proliferation of new technologies. In Syria, mass-mobilization preceded structured organization
of the revolutionaries, which as of late 2014 still proves elusive. The decentralized power of the
Syria opposition initially met the regime with great success. However, the regime was able to
mobilize crushing military force and has proved durable; as such, the Opposition’s attempts to
unify and create a strong organizational capacity have mostly faltered. This perhaps, has in part
explained their lack of success (BBC 2014, b).
Organizational strength is usually demonstrated by an absence of factional conflict and a
clearly established hierarchical chain of command. A strong revolutionary organization can
survive tactical defeat and the loss of key leadership without being crippled, but rather can
prove resilient and durable. However, the Syrian Opposition has not succeeded in this
endeavor. Conversely, the existence of decentralized, horizontal and even online communities
of organizers has proven less vulnerable for many new social movements. In pursuing the
former strategy, the Syrian Opposition has perhaps neglected to hone the latter strength of
collective leadership or the type of decentralized organization of new social movements. Either
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way, eventually institutionalized and formal mechanisms of power must emerge to replace
those of the old regime. The ultimate goal of a successful revolutionary organization is to
establish dual sovereignty or a counter government to replace the existing regime. If a counter
government can actually create the organizational proficiency to develop institutions that
function as government, it will be greatly empowered and a much more of an existential threat
to the existing regime (Greene 1999, 98-99).
Regime access by potential challenger organizations can also prove important in this
area because it facilitates capture of existing institutions. This was especially the case in the
American Revolution where an anti-colonial ideology was strong, and organizations like the
Sons of Liberty and the Committees of Correspondence created strong revolutionary
organizations which were even further strengthened after the convocation of the first
Continental Congress in 1774 and eventually, the Declaration of Independence. Communists in
China and Vietnam were also adept at creating strong organizational networks to levy taxes,
administer government and expand their power bases. Collecting and efficiently applying fiscal
resources are as much a function of an institutionalized opposition, as they are a simple
revolutionary movement, and can often prove invaluable to a revolution’s success. Nowhere, is
the argument for strong organizational networks better exemplified than the soviets (councils)
during the Russian February revolution. At a time of weak governance by the state, the
Petrograd Soviet and other councils came to be dominated by the Bolsheviks who immediately
ran them as a counter government. The National Congress of Soviet and the First Congress
coordinated the activities of the soviets, which included taking over the industrialization of the
country, among other economic and governmental functions. The success of this initiative
allowed the Bolsheviks to establish legitimacy, at the expense of the ruling regime, and
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eventually capture political power and establish sovereignty. (Greene 1999, 100-101). As we
will see, the initial mass mobilization of the Opposition failed to lead to coherent centralized
groups capable of defeating the regime alone, and also failed to adopt more decentralized and
durable collective forms of leadership and organization. Consequently, the Opposition groups
continually fell prey to fragmentation and competition (O’Bagy 2013, b) (Cunningham 2013).

The Syrian Opposition’s Failed Revolutionary Model
Between July and October of 2011, opposition groups began their assault on the Asad
regime but were in urgent need political direction, military capacity, and strategic vision. The
Free Syrian Army emerged as the premier military organization amongst the opposition but the
movement needed political guidance and representation to further its revolutionary aspirations
of destroying the old regime and replacing it with a new form of government (Landis 2011)
(O’Bagy 2013, b). Therefore, many opposition activists eventually met in Istanbul and created
the SNC as the political umbrella for the Opposition. The SNC’s motto “freedom, dignity and
hope for Syria” epitomized not only themes of the Arab Spring, but also many ideological
principles of similar revolutions throughout history. The SNC meant to become the organization
that developed a political framework and strategic vision for the Opposition. It also set out to
become the premier political institution to represent the various opposition forces, groups,
blocs and committees. Its ultimate goal was to create “a democratic, pluralistic, and civil state
(SNC 2012, a),” such values that appeal to Western liberalism. However, it has thus far only
succeeded in partially breaking down the old regime, and has yet to enter a transition period
where they might install a new regime. Toward that goal, the SNC has worked to mobilize crosscutting alliances and unite the efforts of the disparate opposition groups in order to enhance
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communication and coordination among opposition groups and mobilize more of the
population. This endeavor has only proved partially successful, but many of these groups
continued to mobilize under their own authority, so the organizational cohesion of the SNC
remains lacking. The SNC has sought to maintain a flexible outlook regarding disparate groups
within the opposition that do not want to fall under SNC authority. But this, in itself, was an
admission that its organizational authority had limits and would not succeed in unifying all the
opposition under one banner (O’Bagy 2013, b).
The SNC Military Bureau was established in March 2012, to serve as the Ministry of
Defense of the civilian organization to coordinate and direct strategy among the numerous
armed opposition groups fighting in Syria, most prominently, with the FSA. This second effort
was specifically directed at attempting to unify military groups, which had been resistant to the
new umbrella political leadership (SNC 2012, a). However, such efforts proved mostly futile,
and the SNC and other opposition elements again met for a December 2012 Doha Conference
that brought together rebel leaders from across Syria to organize together and announce the
formation of a new 30-member unified command structure called the Supreme Joint Military
Command Council or Supreme Military Command (SMC). The SMC represented an attempt to
streamline the oppositions’ organizational hierarchy and legitimize its authority. However, in
attempting to bring in all of the oppositions’ disparate groups and commanders, it succumbed
to a “bottom up” command structure. Such a flat, decentralized structure lacked institutional
legitimacy and effective command and control (Institute for the Study of War 2014). Therefore,
each group within the opposition continued to act unilaterally, despite loose strategy
coordination and a superficial commitment to cooperation. Top-down organizational
deficiencies created a big problem for the Opposition, not to mention the difficulties directing
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command and control in an environment without modern military and state resources.
Moreover, some of these groups act as localized or regional entities since strategic coordination
among them is inherently difficult (O’Bagy 2013, a). In this way, the Opposition attempted but
failed to create traditional institutions styled on revolutionary governments of the past.
Such a situation added to the Opposition’s failure to produce charismatic central
leadership and agree on a real unifying ideology that went beyond pandering to the West.
Moreover, the power of new social movements and technology was not sufficiently employed
to compel the coalescing of the cross-cutting alliances necessary for revolutionary mobilization.
Despite these various initiatives, the SNC failed to adequately connect with forces on the
ground and suffered legitimacy problems. (O’Bagy 2013, b). Although the SNC has cast itself as
the leading Opposition organization, and espouses the West’s preferred secular and democratic
leanings, it is not necessarily the representative group that would take power in a revolutionary
scenario. Nor do these groups seem capable of forming the cross-sectarian coalitions necessary
to fight a unified effort.
The disunity and diversity of the Syrian opposition, in the end, allowed the rise of ISIL as
the most radical group that proved able to harness all the essential elements of revolutionary
mobilization that the opposition failed to achieve. It’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proved not
only to be a charismatic religious source of emulation, but an effective administrator, strategist,
mobilizer and military commander. His organization also proved more tech savvy than any
other Opposition group. ISIL has used Twitter, online media and professional literature to
broadcast their ideology worldwide. Its methods have proved extremely successful at recruiting
from Middle East countries, but also the West. Ironically, the movement that wishes to take the
region back to a medieval styled Caliphate is the one most successfully harnessing the power of
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new social movements (al-Hayat 2012) (al-Hayat 2014) (al-Hayat 2) (De Kerchove 2014).
Secondly, by creating the fiercest and most powerful military organization among the
opposition, al-Baghdadi was also able to forge or compel alliances among fellow opposition
members, even if their leadership and ideological viewpoints were not aligned. Al-Baghdadi was
also able to ideologically claim the mantle of an Islamic Caliphate, a disputed but largely
successful campaign to rally fundamentalist Muslims to his cause. By demonstrating this
authority, al-Baghdadi was able to undermine support for groups like the al-Qaeda affiliated alNusrah front and other oppositions groups – since many of these groups members simply
wanted to align themselves with the strongest of the fighters. This latter point was also well
demonstrated through ISIL’s propaganda machine that acted as a strong recruiting base for
youthful fundamentalists seeking to undertake Jihad (Caris 2014).

The Use of Violence
A strong organizational capacity also allows a revolutionary movement to employ more
effective techniques to erode the legitimacy of the government and capture political authority.
Among the most common and effective of revolutionary techniques or actions, is the
employment of violence. The range and intensity of violence varies per revolutionary
movement, and can occur both during and after the revolutionary transformation. It is a
common factor in nearly all revolutionary movements and can be considered a symptom of the
inherent radicalism of the revolutionary process. It is a common thread across almost all
revolutionary movements. This latter point is extremely important for understanding the
necessity of radicalizing revolutionary movements. At its core, revolutions reject and seek to
replace the legitimacy of a regime. Only in governments, does a societal contract confer
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monopoly of force – the right to use violence. Therefore it is among the most powerful sources
of governmental authority. Often it is the last technique to hold out among dying regimes and
the first to be adopted by revolutionaries who want to quell challenges to their authority. As
such, revolutionary movements usually must succumb to the use of violence in order to bring
down the ruling regimes (Greene 1999, 105). The purpose of terror in a revolutionary
movement is to destroy the legitimacy of the government by showing it cannot keep order and
security, thereby concurrently increasing feelings of desperation and helplessness among the
population. Though this technique often can have the opposite of its intended effect, and cause
a population to resent and reject revolutionary uses of indiscriminate violence, it can also cause
populations to turn to the opposition for protection or if they are seen as the new power
brokers in society. That being said, terror as the sole or primary technique in a revolutionary
movement’s repertoire rarely leads to success. This is because the principle goal of terror is to
provoke a disproportional and heavy-handed response by state security services that cause
outrage among the populace. Government atrocities, even in response to terror, can be a
powerful recruiting tool for a revolutionary movement. Terror can also disrupt the functioning
of government, where a failing or reeling government causes resentment from the population
(Greene 1999, 106).
Guerrilla warfare is usually a trademark of revolutionary movements because most
often, opposition organizations must resort to irregular and asymmetric warfare to combat
more professional and better-equipped conventional forces. Guerrillas also must live among
the population and win support from the masses. In China and Vietnam, communist leadership
took great care to win over the populations and peasantry, which was key to their success. Mao
Zedong actually canonized these tenets of Guerrilla war for his communist red army in China.
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Rather than fight a conventional war, Mao’s Guerilla tactics called for ambush attacks, short
decisive battles, a resilient and flexible organizational hierarchy, the avoidance of pitched
battles, or any “banditry” that would turn the peasantry against them. Guerrillas must also be
able to establish geographic bases of operation whereby they can plan and support operations,
and build the shadow governments to challenge the existing regime (Greene 1999, 108).
As the success of guerrilla warfare grew, modern states began to develop more
advanced counter-insurgency techniques. Given that the guerrilla’s strength is endurance and
attrition, it is generally recognized that a counterinsurgency army needs a strong ratio in its
favor. Although overwhelming force is no guarantee of success, it is generally the most
successful strategy to pacify a guerrilla army. But of course suppression alone is insufficient to
defeat a guerrilla army or insurgency since those tactics can cause the population to turn in
favor of the guerrillas, as experienced by America in Vietnam (Greene 1999, 110-111).
Terrorists and sometimes urban guerillas use tactics include bombings of symbolic targets,
assassinations and kidnappings of state representatives, and violence against state security
services or supporters of the regime. These tactics are the hallmark of terrorists because they
have virtually no mobility or permissive areas in which to operate, and a limited ability to
confront government targets head on (Greene 1999, 116). Of these groups, ISIL’s brutality is an
effective tool of propaganda and terror, while its ability to inflict maximum violence on the
battlefield has proved an effective tactic (Caris 2014) Consequently, ISIL’s successful
employment of guerrilla and terrorist strategies has allowed it to emerge as the most radical
and most powerful opposition group.
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The Rise of the Radicals
When “rebels” took over areas of Raqqah province and Raqqah city in Eastern Syria
during the spring of 2013, news of the development noted the surprising success with which
the rebels governed. Power and services continued, the city was not severely looted and food
remained available. However, the makings of the new radical Islamic fundamentalist
government were just being realized (Caris 2014). News from the time identified the “rebels” as
associated with the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusrah Front and other Islamic fundamentalist groups.
However, Raqqah city and province was to become the heart of the emerging Islamic State or
Caliphate established under ISIL (O’Bagy 2013, a, 1, 1-5). There was initially some popular
backlash to the new radical governance, but morality police and brute force eventually allowed
ISIL to keep the peace in its areas of control and ultimately expand into new areas. Their
propaganda machine is so successful that it is recruiting new Jihadists from European nations,
many of whom bring with them skills and levels of education that help advance their media
presence, administrative efficiency and military proficiency (ICG 2012).
In June of 2014, ISIL formally announced the formation of its Caliphate, under the
“Islamic State” which spanned large swathes of terrain in Eastern Syria and Western Iraq. This
announcement was not purely for propaganda purposes, it represented a legitimate claim over
the counter-governed territory it had conquered since 2011 (Al-Hayat 2014, a, b) (Caris 2014).
The world now was forced to come to grips with a terrorist state that functioned as a semiconventional military and governed its subjects under a fundamentalist and brutal
interpretation of Islamic Sharia law. Although it lacked international legitimacy, ISIL had come
to command a monopoly of force over its population, had self-sustaining finances, governance
structures and of course an intimidating military force. Through military conquest and political
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campaigns, ISIL’s holistic form of governance has begun to implement religious, judicial,
educational, humanitarian and infrastructure projects. ISIL’s service oriented outreach includes
providing food to the community in such ways as distributing humanitarian aid or supporting
bakeries (Caris 2014). The most sophisticated example of governance under ISIL rule is
witnessed in their self-proclaimed temporary capital of Raqqah city, in Raqqah Province, Syria,
and more recently in the conquered area of Mosul, Iraq. In such places, ISIL holds religious
services and community programs. They also ensure critical infrastructure needs to the best of
their ability. They’ve undertaken genuine attempts at urban management, and have even
administered hydroelectric dams, thermal power plants and oil facilities (ICG 2012). However,
this perceivably softer side of ISIL’s governance comes with strict interpretations of Islamic rule,
justice and education. An even more stark juxtaposition is posed by their brutal behavior, which
is characterized by beheadings, torture, mass executions, crucifixions, slavery, genocide, forced
marriages, rape, kidnapping of men, women and children, as well as the employment of child
soldiers (UN 2014). Although spurned by much of the world, ISIL has attracted new recruits in
the thousands. Not only has ISIL proven able to recruit local Syrian extremists and Iraqis, but
also foreign fighters from across the globe (ICG 2012). By September 2014, the number of
European Jihadists joining ISIL surged to surpass 3,000, according to the EU Counter-Terrorism
Chief (De Kerchove 2014). Should ISIL be allowed to retain a state-like existence, it’s movement
will grow and such humanitarian atrocities will continue.
As we have seen, such systemic violence and instability breeds the emergence of
similarly radical and brutal movements. In Syria, ISIL has been forged in the crucible of violence,
sectarianism, Islamic fundamentalism and hatred. Given such an environment, it is unsurprising
that the strongest group to emerge would exhibit all these characteristics combined. The
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protracted nature of the conflict has also likely contributed to ISIL’s rise. And this lengthy and
systemic conflict can partially be attributable to outside interference, as we will see.
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Chapter Six: The Role of External Intervention in Prolonging the Conflict
External intervention can decisively advantage the regime or the opposition, depending
on the circumstances. But when external intervention becomes a competition, and the
revolutionary environment becomes a proxy battleground, the result is simply to prolong the
conflict. Revolutions are much more easily understood as an isolated political phenomenon,
and even then they’re quite complex and unpredictable. Yet, they are made significantly more
unpredictable when introducing intervening variables in the form of state resources. Such
international intervention then requires the consideration of overlapping theories of
International Relations. This is because external intervention to support revolutionaries or the
regime can come in many different forms, at many different levels. The introduction of state
resources to a conflict can often tip the balance severely in one sides favor, or greatly
exacerbate and prolong the fighting. This is because revolutionaries get by on limited resources
and often employ guerilla tactics; whereas, governments experiencing revolutions are often in a
weakened state and appreciative having outside state support. The provision of sanctuary can
also be of great importance for revolutionary movements and is one passive and plausibly
deniable form of support, whereas, the provision of materiel or other military support can
conversely serve to turn the tide of revolutionary conflict. For example, French support during
the American Revolution very well may have been integral to its success. External support in
the modern era has proved very important, especially among societies caught in the Cold War
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rivalry between the U.S. and Russia, where the provision or withholding of support often
determined the fate of the nation in question.
External support affects the distribution or accumulation of resources, but it can also
serve to affect organizational dynamics of the movement itself. Moreover, external support
actively affects the strategic direction and repertoire of a movement since the provision of the
state resources are often given on a quid pro quo basis. Such support often comes with strings
attached or significant direction on how such resources will be allocated. State leaders and
bureaucrats understand the workings of revolutions and often intervene in ways to ensure or
deny their success. To maximize chances of success, external governments will often try to
actively support their proxy of choice with arms, money, training or logistical supplies (Greene
1999, 128). This support can apply to the regime or opposition, and can have a great effect
depending on the level of support given.
External intervention in the case of Syria is important to understand because it is
partially responsible for stalemating and prolonging the conflict. The influx of resources has
given the Syrian regime the funding and arms to continue fighting, while the same is true of the
Opposition. Russia and Iran are supporting their ally Bashar al-Asad and are likely funneling
support to him. Their financial and materiel support has probably been integral to propping up
his regime (Nasr 2013). Conversely, foreign backers from Arab states, particularly Qatar and
Saudi Arabia, have likely aided the Opposition. The financial and materiel support from these
countries is likely helping to fuel the fight on the side of the Opposition (Dickinson 2013). A
closer look at this dichotomy will reveal why external support can become such an important
development in revolutionary situations and act as the unforeseen and often unpredictable
intervening variable to change the whole course of events.
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Asad’s Camp
Even following the horrific chemical weapons attacks conducted by the Asad regime, its
patrons remain firmly supportive. Syria’s allies, Russia and Iran continue to act as benefactors.
Factoring into their strategic calculations are economic concerns and geo-political fears over
the shifting balance of power. For Russia, economics plays a large part since Syria is one of its
biggest buyers of Russian arms, likely totaling over four billion in contracts with the Russian
defense department (Christia 2013). Syria is also important for Russia’s strategic defense
posture in the region since the leasing of a naval base on Syria’s Tartus port gives Russia its only
direct maritime access to the Mediterranean Sea (Christia 2013). Russia’s strategy is also rooted
in ideological concerns since it doesn’t believe a revolutionary situation in Syria will bring a
regime any better than the one before, and instead, they correctly assume any replacement
regime would not benefit Russia’s interests the way Asad has been a friend to Russia. Russia
also seeks to oppose the U.S. for ideological reasons, so that American influence doesn’t
increase, by way of vanquishing a long time U.S. foe and ally of Russia (Christia 2013) (Bitar
2013, 2-5).
As a result, Russia is using all its levers of power to prop up the Asad regime. This
includes its veto as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council, economic support, as
well as the provision of military materials to the regime. By using its veto in the U.N. multiple
times during the duration of the Syrian conflict, Russia has been able to bloc multiple measures
that would have come down hard on the Syrian regime, including multi-lateral military
intervention (Yan 2013).
For Iran’s part, Syria’s long-term alliance with Iran has been grounded in religion and
geo-political strategy. Iran is the world’s only theocracy, dominated by the Shiite sect of Islam.
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The Alawite’s, which include Bashar al-Asad and much of the ruling regime, are an offshoot of
Shiism, who’s religious practices even include elements of Christianity, Gnosticism and
mysticism. Although the Alawites are not fully ideologically aligned with Iran’s brand of Shiism,
this bond has helped keep both nations close and has become increasingly pronounced as
sectarianism across the region has divided Sunni and Shia states geo-politically. But above all, it
is common interests that have endured since the times of Iran’s eight year war with Iraq, and
ultimately strengthened as Syria became an integral link to Iran’s most trusted surrogate and
proxy in Lebanon, Lebanese Hizballah. Through supporting Lebanese Hizballah, Iran is able to
threaten its hated enemy, Israel. Given the key role Syria plays in Iran’s regional calculus, it has
likely provisioned high levels of support to the Asad regime, including: intelligence,
communications, crowd control equipment, and advanced weaponry (Nasr 2013) (Yan 2013).
Iran’s security and intelligence services are advising and assisting the Syrian military and it has
deployed expeditionary forces to Syria in support of the Asad regime (Fulton 2013). It has also
supplied the regime with essential military supplies, primarily via air cargo. Iran is also
supporting pro-government militias and proxy militias from outside states. The presence of
external, Iranian backed militias is an indicator of just how far the conflict and proxy war have
expanded (Bitar, 2013, 3-5) (Fulton 2013) (Yan 2013).

The Opposition’s Backers
Arab Monarchies have emerged as the regional enemies of Asad and the backers of
numerous groups that continue to fuel the ongoing insurgency. Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Qatar
are among the biggest contributors of finances, arms, training and even diplomatic support to
the rebel groups. There are over 1,000 rebel brigades fighting Asad, most are likely financed
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from abroad (O’Bagy 2013, b). As mentioned in previous chapters, the disparate nature of the
Opposition has prevented the type of unity of effort required to succeed (Dickinson 2013). With
so many groups unable to work together as a unified, coherent actor, their prospects for
building the type of shadow government necessary to replace the regime have diminished.
Instead, the Opposition is composed of numerous, individual parts, all controlled by different
actors with different interests. These groups have very local and regionalized goals, but are
unable to from work toward a national strategy given their repeated failures to establish
umbrella groups and a centralized organizational capacity (O’Bagy 2013, b) (Dickinson 2013).
Moreover, the financing of rebel groups has become a fanciful “game” of sorts, where
the revolutionary movement itself has morphed into a proxy war partly funded by foreign
states. Wealthy Gulf State elites including businessmen, princes, government officials, even
parliamentarians are participating in the financing of insurgent groups (Dickinson2013, 1-5).
The financing of such groups gained momentum during the uprisings in 2011 but gained even
more momentum during the turn to broad civil conflict in 2012. These groups eventually turned
to social media and other Internet forums to popularize their success, gain notoriety and win
more funding, thus creating a cyclical, self-sustaining insurgency. Unlike officials of Western
nations, many of whom also supported arming the rebels, Gulf donors cared less about
ideological persuasions or even extremism within the ranks of their preferred insurgent groups.
Given this fact, extremist groups and Western designated terrorists are likely getting access to
some of the funding, which further complicates any effort to mobilize a unified democratic
front within the opposition. Because of Kuwait’s lax fundraising laws, many of these donors
finance these groups independently. Such operations are more difficult in Saudi Arabia and
Qatar because of tighter regulations, yet both nations are bringing state sponsorship to the
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effort (Dickinson 2013). Nevertheless, the capitalist enterprise of Kuwaiti proxy groups
financing has played a major role in supporting insurgent efforts, and inadvertently keeping
them from unifying. In fact, competition for donors has caused infighting among the myriad of
insurgent groups (Dickinson 2013) (Christia 2013).
In 2013, donor fatigue began to set in and the financing of insurgent groups declined in
popularity somewhat. Many donors are in fact disillusioned with the hardline Islamist, radical
and extremist elements who are gaining ground (Dickinson 2013). The decentralization of the
Sunni backing will likely contribute to the declining relevance of the wider opposition. The
unreliable and decentralized nature of the foreign backing prevents the Opposition from
attaining the revolutionary characteristics necessary to succeed in ousting Asad and replacing
his authoritarian system. Meanwhile, the rise of ISIL has caused backers of the Opposition to
become more wary about whom they support, or indirectly support (Dickinson 2013).

The Role of the West
Despite two years of brutal oppression and atrocities against its own people, only in
mid-2013 would the regime be faced with an international legal and existential military threat
to its survival. After months of Opposition claims that Asad’s forces had used chemical
weapons, video proof from the town of Ghouta shone a spotlight on the regime’s attack, and
ultimately led to a U.N. investigation that confirmed the use of Sarin chemical agents in the
regime airstrikes. The regime was subsequently censured by the U.N. (U.N. 2013). Although the
international legal ramifications against the regime were costly, the ultimate decision to forgo
military intervention called into question international resolve to deter regimes responsible for
chemical weapon use, particularly in light of President Obama’s avowed commitment to
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prevent and punish Asad’s from using them (Farley 2013). Nevertheless, it was not immediately
clear the U.S. would not act, so in the face of punitive or regime changings strikes the regime
turned to its ally Russia to diplomatically block a solution (Gearan 2013). Such a compromise
came to deescalate the threat of military intervention as Syria conceded to weapons inspection
and eventual destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles (OPCW 2013). Syria and Russia’s
well-orchestrated diplomatic solution prevented a scenario where the West intervened
military, a scenario that easily could have tipped the balance and turned the tide in favor of the
regime. The prospect of overwhelming international intervention could have acted as an
accelerator and catalyst for revolution; however, such hopes by the opposition proved fleeting
and unfulfilled.
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Conclusion: Revolutionary conditions unmet, but the radicals are unleashed
This study concludes with three primary judgments. First, the necessary conditions for
Syria to undergo a revolution, i.e. the destruction of the Asad regime and replacement by a
movement from the opposition, have yet to be activated. Specifically, Syria’s opposition lacks
the leadership, cross-cutting alliances, cohesion, external support and requisite resource
mobilization capacity to force the Asad regime from power. Conversely, the regime is
advantaged by the ideological unity under the Baath party, the cohesiveness of its ruling polity,
its military power and its strong external backing. In order for the opposition to succeed, it will
require a stronger and more focused level of support from its external backers; anything short
of direct regime-changing intervention may not be enough. This assessment is not meant as a
normative judgment on whether regime-changing intervention is just or necessary; rather, it is
simply a judgment on what variable may tip the balance in the Opposition’s favor, and against
the regime. For the Opposition to succeed, it could also gain advantage by developing more
charismatic leaders and an ideology capably of unifying a broad base of challenger groups. Thus
far, it has failed to wield revolutionary change through the mass mobilization model of new
social movements, or military action alone. Rather, such a radical revolutionary coalition has
proved more successful in the form of ISIL and its tacit allies.
This leads to the second judgment. The conditions created by the revolutionaries have
shaped an environment where the “rise of the radicals” has occurred despite the fact that
Syria’s revolutionary trajectory remains incomplete. The protracted conflict and revolutionary
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environment in Syria allowed the strongest and most radical groups of all to emerge from the
violent, ungoverned space that has expanded since 2011. The lesson from Syria, therefore, is
self-evident. Protracted and incomplete revolutionary societies likely create an environment
that allows for violence, instability and radicalism to thrive. And perhaps, creating a perpetual
conflict, with no real winner, may cause a scenario where the period of radical rule might
become more even more difficult to overcome. Although this last statement is not empirically
proven by this analysis, it certainly warrants more detailed comparative analysis and should
likely serve as a cautionary tale for governments, community leaders and international
organizations.
The last key judgment is on the role of external intervention. As an intervening variable,
external intervention from all sides has directly altered the course of Syria’s revolution. This
factor must be accounted for in future study of revolutionary societies. As we have seen,
external intervention in Syria has caused three distinct effects. For one, international support to
the Opposition helped fuel the violent challenge to the regime. This support in turn, helped
sustain the Opposition’s military revolt, while attempting to give it the revolutionary capacity to
destroy the regime. Separate cases of external intervention helped to counteract the
Opposition and its backers by propping up the regime. By supporting the regime and
continually reinforcing its pillars of legitimacy, Asad has managed to withstand years of violent
civil conflict and a sizable rebellion. Finally, the counteractive forces supporting both the
Opposition and the regime have had the net effect of prolonging the conflict. Neither side has
yet to suffer the attrition that would lead to defeat, rather, the influx of resources continues to
fuel conflict. Moreover, neither side has managed to tip the balance in either camp’s favor, so
the conflict remains stalemated and extremely violent. Such cause and effects warrant further
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study, particularly in the realm of international relations. In an increasingly globalized world,
analyzing revolutionary societies in a vacuum will neglect the internationalization of such
conflicts.
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